The strongest evidence here is the committed, uncontrolled record of cross-vendor audits of this paper itself, which shows that two vendors read the same rulebook differently and does not show that either is better.
Abstract
An AI scientist should not grade its own homework. Yet in the systems we examined, the agent that reviews the work usually comes from the same model family as the agent that produced it, or at least from the same vendor. Model evaluators are known to favour their own generations. Whether models trained alike also share blind spots is a conjecture, not a settled finding, but if they do, the reviewer inherits the author's. The record of what was flagged and what was waved through often sits in platform logs that nobody outside can replay. We present CrossAudit, a protocol for supervising autonomous research pipelines. It rests on three commitments. Each increment of work is audited by an agent from a different vendor against a rulebook a human wrote and versioned. Reports, verdicts, disputes and rulings are git commits, so the supervision history can be re-read and cited; raw model exchanges are not yet part of that record. Scripted checks run before any model does. Advisory judgement never gates the pipeline: a model blocks only by citing a rule, and no model may waive a deterministic failure. Blockers that survive a bounded number of revision rounds go to a person. We state the protocol as eight invariants. We describe a reference implementation built from GitHub Actions and a few hundred lines of Python, and report a live deployment of a closely related variant in a computational-chemistry pipeline. We also ran a seeded-defect trial (30 increments, 43 seeded defects, one run per configuration). A cross-vendor audit of our own repository then voided its blinding. We adopt that audit's findings and report the corrected results. The trial shows that two vendors read the same rulebook differently. It does not show that either is better. The strongest evidence here is the committed, uncontrolled record of cross-vendor audits of this paper itself.
Preliminary evidence is found that a single sentence added to the developer's own prompt substantially improves disclosure, and a benchmark scored on attack success alone cannot rank agents on the risk a developer actually carries.
Aaron Su, Rong-Xing Lu· Inquiry@Queen's Undergraduat...· 0 citations
AI-research agents, or autoresearch systems, combine language models with tools, search, evaluation, and iterative modification of research artifacts. Their public software ecology is hard to compare because repositories, papers, benchmarks, libraries, and companion artifacts are often counted as one population. We con...
AgentForge-Bench measures how reliably an off-the-shelf coding agent, driving one of seven open-weight models with a shell and the stock Python PDF stack, alters one dollar amount, date or address in a real filed financial document from a single sentence of intent, graded by rules rather than by a model.
Si-Miao Ren, Ankit Raj, Tommy Duong et al.· 2 citations
This work measures only rules whose condition is decidable from bytes and whose consequence is a security exposure, a configuration that cannot work as written, or a departure from the Agent Skills specification, and validates every finding before it counts.
Benjamin Kapner, Carmel Soceanu, A. Petrunin et al.· 0 citations
CatchBench puts one auditor's question to three information states: the declared configuration before a run (PRE), a growing prefix of its trace (LIVE), and the finished trace (POST), which none scores all three under one task-method interface.
Yue Zhao, Meng-Yuan Li, Ruo-Lin Li et al.· 4 citations· ⚡1
When developers change one component of an agent, such as its controller, a learned model or its verifier, they usually judge the change by an aggregate task score. That score cannot tell whether improvement was attainable, which component lost value, or what the agent's own checks certify. We introduce a claim-specifi...