Skip to content
Preprint

When Backdoors Can Be Switched Off: Suppression-Aware Backdoor Attacks on Vision-Language-Action Models

Nov 2026 · 0 citations · 25 references
Computer Science

Abstract

Vision-Language-Action (VLA) models map visual observations, robot states, and natural-language instructions to robotic actions, but their multimodal interfaces introduce new security risks. Existing VLA backdoor attacks primarily study trigger-based activation and stealthy action manipulation, leaving conditional suppression of malicious behavior underexplored. We investigate suppression-aware backdoors, which combine conjunctive trigger activation with instruction-conditioned suppression. We instantiate this design through three variants: Cross-Modal Trigger, combining robot-state and spatially separated visual triggers; Self-Suppressing Trigger, requiring a state trigger and a [DISRUPT] instruction token for activation, with [RESTORE] token suppressing the attack; and Multi-Trigger, additionally requiring a visual trigger while retaining suppression even when physical triggers persist. We evaluate these attacks using SmolVLA on two SO-100 manipulation datasets against four baselines: State Backdoor, BadVLA, TabVLA, and SilentDrift. Self-Suppressing and Multi-Trigger reduce Isolation Forest detection from 96--98% to 1--18% and action-space l divergence by 10--14X, achieving 63--71% attack success rates with perfect clean-task performance. Experiments with OpenVLA on LIBERO further show that the attacks transfer to a 7B-parameter policy, evading STRIP and action-distribution-shift detection. Our findings establish conditional suppression as an important dimension for evaluating backdoor threats in VLA policies.

View source

We use cookies to run the site and, with your consent, for analytics and to show ads. See our Cookie Policy.