Contemporary AI systems are increasingly designed to reduce uncertainty, ambiguity, and cognitive burden. This article argues that such systems do not merely expand human capacities but progressively externalize forms of judgment and existential burden that Christian traditions have historically understood as necessary conditions for the cultivation of moral agency. Drawing on the theological anthropologies of Augustine, Søren Kierkegaard, and Dietrich Bonhoeffer, the article develops a theological-anthropological critique of what it terms optimization culture: the normative logic through which the reduction of friction and existential difficulty becomes a dominant telos of technological design. Contemporary articulations of this logic are examined through the work of Jacques Ellul, Byung-Chul Han, Peter Thiel, Balaji Srinivasan, and William Davies. The article argues that AI systems shaped by this logic risk progressively externalizing the practices of disciplined attention, existential responsibility, and costly judgment through which mature moral agency has historically been cultivated. In response, it proposes a formative anthropology of technology as a framework for evaluating AI not only according to functional criteria such as safety or efficiency, but according to the kinds of human beings such systems actively help to form.
The present article presents and discusses the foundations of the New Moral Realism proposed by Markus Gabriel in Ethics for Dark Times (2020), a work that extends his New Realism project into the field of ethics. Starting from a metaethical defense of moral realism, Gabriel argues that there are objective moral facts,...
The ESG (Environmental, Social, and Governance) regime has consolidated as the principal normative architecture of corporate activity in Europe. Academic critique of the phenomenon has been predominantly technical—divergence among rating agencies, agency problems, and empirical ineffectiveness—ethical critique remains...
This paper develops a normative framework for expanding moral considerability under conditions of ecological crisis and epistemic uncertainty. Building on The Moral Circle, I begin from the claim that a non-negligible probability of moral status is sufficient to generate moral reasons for inclusion. I argue that the fo...
P. Pecere· Asian Journal of Philosophy· 0 citations
The article demonstrates how attempts to decentre the human often reconstitute new forms of authority in attempts to decentre the human and examines the possibility of surpassing standard anthropocentric approaches in AI while maintaining a critical philosophical engagement with the structurally necessary yet precariou...
It is argued that contemporary artificial intelligence is best understood as a symptom and accelerator of modern nihilism rather than as a neutral instrument or proto-subject because it allows values to persist as calculable effects rather than contested commitments, thereby insulating human agents from the burden of j...
It is argued that predictive systems must be understood as formative environments that shape attention, imagination, and desire through patterned repetition and the strategic management of salience.
Åke Elden· New Blackfriars· 0 citations
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