Deciding in the shadow of the state: when regulatory logic collides with market logic
Abstract
Capital allocation models treat planning inputs as market-governed, even when they originate from political authority. Written for The Practice of Making Decisions section of Management Decision, this paper develops a three-phase response: classify each input, stress test it against a change of authority and design commitments that can move if the answer changes. The process is built from the tasks the decision involves, not from theory. A constructed vignette of a wine producer entering Mendoza runs through the argument; three documented situations (utility privatization, wine internationalization, EU digital regulation) serve as retrospective illustrations. Standard tools presume a judgment they do not perform: which institutional logic governs each input; tagging inputs by source, durability and evidence confidence comes first. In Mendoza the commitment changes form, not direction: purchase becomes staged entry sized to survive the incentive's loss. Retrospective illustrations show compatibility with documented responses, not conscious use or performance effects. Each phase specifies questions, participants, outputs and revisit triggers; a decision matrix and a pre-commitment checklist support its use. The contribution is a managerial task rather than a theory of political risk: assessing the institutional source and durability of planning inputs before scenario analysis and option pricing.