From Counterterrorism to Nation-Building: The United States in Afghanistan, 2001–2021

Abstract

This article examines why the Taliban returned to Kabul in 2021, twenty years after the United States removed them from power in a matter of weeks. It argues that the collapse of the Afghan Republic cannot be understood separately from the way the Taliban regime was overthrown in 2001. The decision to invade followed the 9/11 attacks and the Taliban’s refusal to hand over Osama bin Laden, although Cold War proxy politics, regional rivalries, and the neglect after 1989 had already set the stage. Washington justified the use of force as self-defence. The campaign won a swift military victory through air power, special forces, and Afghan partners, but it did not produce an inclusive political settlement. Two decades of foreign aid, reliance on strongmen, and a divided government could not fill that gap, while the Taliban regrouped in sanctuary in Pakistan. Using a “victory–vacuum–dependence” model, the article shows that the Doha Agreement and the 2021 withdrawal exposed this weakness and did not independently cause the collapse. Military success does not automatically become political success.