Theoretical Problems of AI Integration into the State-Legal Field
Abstract
The article presents generalizations made by the author based on a doctrinal analysis of the practice of introducing artificial intelligence into the public legal sphere. The purpose of the article is to show the deep contradictions that arise at the junction of the ontology of human freedom, which is the basis of law, and the ontology of probabilistic computing, correlations and optimization of functions, which is the basis of artificial intelligence. These contradictions form an actual context for the formulation of theoretical and legal problems, the solution of which can serve as an aid in the development of ways and mechanisms to reduce the severity of existing contradictions, as well as act as a driver in determining the vector of legal thought to ensure the effectiveness of legal regulation in the future. The formulation of relevant problems and the definition of their composition form a pool of tasks to be solved in this study. The author uses the universal dialectical method of cognition and general scientific and private scientific research methods based on it — formal legal, comparative legal, methods of legal modeling and forecasting, logical, empirical, rational and systematic approaches, as well as cognitive tools such as analysis, synthesis, induction, deduction, etc. The research highlights cross‑cutting issues relevant to any application of artificial intelligence, as well as the unique challenges that artificial intelligence poses to law‑making, affecting the very nature of law. The conclusion is made about the need to form a new paradigm of lawmaking and the development of law, its basic outline and principles are defined.