Information and economic asymmetry in the creation of digital platforms for enterprise material and technical supply: institutional control mechanism on the part of the business customer

Abstract

In the context of the transformation of the Russian corporate software market, the role of internal IT departments in creating digital platforms for material and technical supply (MTS) is increasing. At the same time, in-house development projects are often characterized by deviations from initial estimates in terms of time, labor intensity and budget. The purpose of the study is to identify the institutional causes of such deviations and to develop an organizational and economic mechanism of control on the part of the business customer. The theoretical basis was formed by the provisions of agency theory, transaction cost theory, economic theory of bureaucracy and institutional analysis. It is shown that in-house development forms a multi-level agency vertical in which information asymmetry consistently increases, and reserves included in labor intensity estimates at different levels can accumulate. Eight forms of potentially opportunistic behavior of internal IT departments are systematized and their observable signs are identified. The choice between in-house development and engaging an external contractor is considered as the task of organizing comparable price and performance signals. A control loop is proposed, including acceptance by result, reference forecasting, analysis of the digital trace of development, stage-by-stage financing, as well as securing for the customer the rights to architecture, code and data. To assess the maturity of such a loop, a development transparency index is proposed. The practical applicability of the approach is shown on the example of procurement management systems.