Machine intelligence as a category of technoculture: operational mediation and limits of technical agency

Abstract

The aim of the research is the explication of the concept of "machine intelligence" as a cultural-philosophical category describing the participation of technical systems in the intellectual practices of modern technoculture. By means of conceptual and comparative analysis, the article examines the semantic heterogeneity of the term "artificial intelligence," identifies the anthropomorphic assumptions of its classical interpretations, and substantiates the distinction between artificial intelligence as a designation of a scientific and technical field and machine intelligence as a cultural-philosophical category. The scientific novelty lies in the interpretation of machine intelligence as a form of operational mediation and in determining the conditions under which this concept is applicable to technical systems. Such conditions include delegating a specific operation to the system, representing a situation in a form accessible for machine processing, having several possible solution options, and incorporating the obtained result into subsequent judgment, choice, or action. As a result, machine intelligence is defined as the ability of a technical system to select or form a relevant result in a situation that allows for several possible solutions. It is shown that such an understanding makes it possible to register the technical agency of machine systems without attributing subjectivity, authorship, or moral responsibility to them.