Institutional Divergence and the Inevitability of the American Revolution: A Comparative Analysis of British and Colonial Political Structures

Abstract

The American Revolution did not begin with a single tax dispute or a short-lived problem of imperial administration. It was caused by a deep incompatibility between the two constitutional systems in the empire at that time. Eighteenth-century Britain increasingly considered parliamentary sovereignty indivisible and legally unrestricted, while the North American colonies had established elected assemblies, local taxation and customary practices of self-government that were regarded as constitutional rights. By comparing the institutions and history of both Britain and the colonies, this study examines the conflicts among their parliaments, trade regulations, etc., and explores why the empire fell. Based on the above analysis, the findings reveal that the fiscal measures introduced after 1763 were indeed far-reaching, they transferred actual governing power from the colonies to Britain without establishing colonial representation or forming a common-law division of powers. The Declaratory Act, the Townshend Acts and the Coercive Acts made disputes over policy disputes about the location of legitimate authority. By 1774, peaceful adjustment would require Parliament to waive its claim to authority in all cases or for the colonies to relinquish the autonomy gained through political experience. Neither side had an institution that could give such a concession legal force. Therefore, the Revolution was not inevitable from the start, rather, it became structurally unavoidable when constitutional compromise failed to provide an enforceable and legitimate solution.