Abandoned, lost, or discarded fishing gear recycling and regeneration: A stochastic evolutionary game model for marine plastic reuse.

Abstract

Abandoned, lost, or discarded fishing gear is a major source of global marine plastic pollution. It causes lasting harm to marine ecosystems and fisheries. This study focuses on seafaring fishermen, recycling and regeneration enterprises, and local governments. We construct a stochastic evolutionary game model for ALDFG recycling. Gaussian white noise models uncertainty from market fluctuations, policy changes, and environmental variation. The model systematically analyzes strategy evolution and key influencing factors for the three parties. Results show that changes in cost, revenue and price, risk and damage, and subsidy parameters produce different evolutionary responses across the three actors. When active strategies generate sufficient payoff advantages, the system tends to evolve toward the high-participation equilibrium 111. Moderate subsidies are more conducive to coordinated participation among all three actors, whereas relatively high subsidy levels are associated with a lower probability of active intervention by local governments. Random disturbances significantly increase strategy fluctuations, especially affecting fishermen. This study provides theoretical support for ALDFG management from behavioral and institutional perspectives. It also informs policy for marine plastic control and resource recycling.