From possession conditions to the genesis of concepts: Peacocke and Cognitive Psychiatry

Abstract

Christopher Peacocke proposed that a concept is individuated by the conditions a subject must meet to possess it, bringing the philosophy of concepts closer to cognition, but he left unexplained how those conditions arise. This article aims to propose, from the standpoint of Cognitive Psychiatry, a genetic and communicational theory of conceptualization that completes Peacocke’s theory of possession conditions. It is a theoretical proposal essay supported by a narrative review of recent literature (2021–2026) in philosophy of mind, cognitive science, developmental psychology and neuroscience. A possession condition describes a state; a formation condition describes the history that produced it. Conceptualization begins in bodily praxias coupled to processes in the world, whose integration sediments a processuality that organizes later experience as a genetically constituted processual a priori: functionally prior, genetically acquired. A blind person who possesses DOG shows that conceptual identity depends on sufficient processual convergence, not on a shared sensory modality. Peacocke’s method works as reverse engineering of the adult concept, whereas Cognitive Psychiatry proposes an embryology of the concept. Since concepts have different formation routes, a differential genetics and a differential clinic of conceptualization are required, informed by clinical dissociations. Communication takes part in conceptual genesis, so publicity becomes cognitive-communicational interoperability, and supra-individual objectivity is explained historically, without a Platonic realm. At both levels, the constituted becomes constituent. A three-level integration is proposed: formation, possession and development. Objections are answered and testable predictions derived. Peacocke is not wrong, but genetically incomplete.