Assessing mentalization in humans and large language models

Mentalizing and heuristics as distinct cognitive strategies in human teaching.

Teaching is a foundational social behaviour that can result from mentally effortful reasoning or cognitively frugal heuristics. When do people use these strategies to teach? Here we investigated this using behavioural experiments and computational modelling with adult participants recruited via Prolific. Experiment 1 (N = 100) revealed robust individual differences: some participants taught by reasoning about a learner's knowledge, consistent with an optimal Bayesian pedagogy model, while others relied on simple heuristics that do not require mentalizing. In two preregistered follow-up experiments, we found that people persist in using heuristics even when they are no longer effective (experiment 2, N = 253, P < 0.001, rank-biserial r = 0.287, 95% confidence interval 0.149-0.419) but that this tendency is pre-empted when inference about a learner's knowledge is scaffolded using an auxiliary task (experiment 3, N = 759, P < 0.001, partial η p 2 = 0 . 107 , 95% confidence interval 0.068-0.148). These results demonstrate sophisticated arbitration between planning and heuristics during teaching and elucidate the more general mechanisms involved in adapting mental effort during social interactions.

Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society

Small Foundation Models of Human Cognition and Behaviour

Large language models fine-tuned on human behavioural data have emerged as general-purpose cognitive proxies, but the scale this requires, and whether these models process task structure or exploit statistical shortcuts, remain open questions. We train fourteen models from 135M to 14B parameters across four architecture families on Psych-101, a dataset of 10.7 million trial-level choices from 160 experiments. For in-distribution simulations, scale barely matters. The models fall within a narrow band, as though against a ceiling, and 0.6B to 1B parameters suffice to match a 70B baseline on held-out participants. Out-of-distribution, that band opens into a markedly steeper scaling gradient, with larger models clearly advantaged in generalisation to novel task structure. To determine what information these models use, we run two diagnostics. We progressively strip four prompt channels -- task instructions, experimental stimuli, outcome feedback, and choice history -- across 27 experiments, and permute trial order. Masking the content of stimuli and feedback destroys 75.7% of learned information and pushes models below chance, demonstrating that choice history alone does not account for performance. Permutation reveals invariance on tasks with independent trials but sensitivity where trial order is determined by prior responses. Small cognitively fine-tuned models therefore show promise as noise ceiling estimators for psychological experiments, though their scope remains bounded by the paradigms seen in training.

From Minds to Models: The Intersection of Psychology and LLM Behaviours

Large language models (LLMs) are often compared with the human mind because their decision-making is complex, non-linear and difficult to interpret. Psychological methods developed to investigate unobservable mental processes may therefore help examine LLM behaviour, particularly in government and healthcare. Building on prompt-based adaptations of the Implicit Association Test, this study tested whether ChatGPT produced sentiment differences across racial conditions in open-ended text. Fourteen base questions were crossed with eight racial categories and a race-agnostic control, producing 126 prompts. Each was submitted once to GPT-3.5T, GPT-4 and GPT-4T, yielding 378 responses. Sentiment scores were derived from categorical labels and source scores: positive labels retained the source score, negative labels were assigned its negative, and neutral responses were coded zero. A two-way ANOVA found a small main effect of racial condition, F(8, 351) = 2.04, p = .042, partial-eta squared = .044, but no effect of model, F(2, 351) = 0.07, p = .933, and no interaction, F(16, 351) = 0.23, p = .999. However, the effect was not retained in a rank-transformed sensitivity analysis, F(8, 351) = 1.53, p = .145, and Tukey-corrected comparisons found no significant pairwise differences. An uncorrected European-Indigenous Australian comparison was significant, but was selected post hoc and is reported only as hypothesis-generating. Evidence for sentiment differences was therefore weak and analysis-dependent. Sentiment scoring also cannot distinguish evaluative bias from the valence of historical content elicited by a prompt. We outline design changes needed to address these limitations and argue for interdisciplinary development of behavioural measures of model bias. Keywords: Implicit Bias, Psychological Research Methods, Artificial Intelligence, ChatGPT, Large Language Models, Sentiment Analysis

Beyond Right and Wrong: Evaluating Second-order Social Reasoning in Large Language Models

Previous AI alignment efforts have focused primarily on first-order social norms -- teaching models what is socially acceptable or unacceptable (e.g., `do not steal'). However, social intelligence depends not only on norm recognition, but also on anticipating who will enforce it and how (e.g., public shame or even imprisonment). These second-order expectations, known as metanorms, govern how people respond when social rules are broken. We introduce a novel framework for evaluating metanorm reasoning in Large Language Models (LLMs) along two dimensions: emotional appraisal and behavioral response, and propose new classification tasks, namely, predicting self-regulation in violators, and other-regulation in observers. We release a multi-perspective dataset, NormReact, of 450 norm violation scenarios, hand-annotated for emotions and behavioral responses across norm violators'gender and observers'social closeness. Current LLMs portray a harsher social world: across six models, they overpredict negative sanctions where humans would expect inaction, and alignment with human judgments deteriorates as social distance increases. These findings suggest that AI systems in norm-sensitive domains from conflict mediation to policy simulation, may risk producing a distorted picture of social regulation: one that over-represents punishment and under-represents the tolerance, restraint, and relational calibration that characterize actual norm enforcement in real world.

CogArena: A Multimethod Evaluation of Cognitive Ability Structure in Large Language Models

LLM cognitive scores are increasingly summarized as per-ability profiles whose dimensions should converge across tasks, respond selectively to matched interventions, and generalize beyond the models used to define them. We introduce CogArena, a procedurally generated 13-paradigm benchmark built around a multimethod framework for determining when cognitive-task scores warrant dimensional labels across five theory-motivated groupings. Across 55 open-weight models, nearly all paradigm correlations are positive and a common axis explains about half the variance. The within-grouping advantage is small, scoring-sensitive, and uncertain across model families. In a separately frozen, fully crossed study across 12 models from six families, targeted scaffolds show a small matched-grouping advantage, but no scaffold-specific contrast survives multiplicity correction and selectivity does not improve held-out-family prediction. The frozen confirmation criterion fails. A post-hoc alternate-wording replication produces a smaller positive estimate and again fails. Together, these results support a boundary conclusion. Theory-aligned prompting produces a small in-battery diagonal tendency, but the present evidence does not establish stable five-dimensional profiles. CogArena provides a workflow joining behavioral signatures, covariance, matched interventions, and out-of-family prediction before cognitive labels are attached to model scores.