Commentary: Qi, J. et al. Towards trustworthy agentic AI: a comprehensive survey of safety, robustness, privacy, and system security. Acad. AI Appl. 2026, 2, 8260
Jul 2026· Academia AI and Applications· Vol 2· 0 citations· 16 references
Abstract
This survey offers a rigorous and welcome map of agentic artificial intelligence (AI) trustworthiness, organised around two dimensions the authors identify as critical for high-risk deployment: safety and robustness, and privacy and system security. By design, the survey treats value alignment, transparency, fairness, and accountability as relevant contexts rather than as core dimensions. This commentary advances a friendly amendment: accountability is not a peripheral dimension that can be deferred, but the binding constraint on agentic-AI trustworthiness. The reason it resists the survey’s stage-targeted, technical treatment is structural and temporal. Accountability mechanisms are deliberative and operate at human, institutional speed; agentic systems act autonomously, continuously, and at scale. This asymmetry—a governance lag—means that even a fully implemented suite of technical mitigations leaves a residual gap that only governance can close, while prevailing governance instruments remain calibrated to human-paced oversight. A complete trustworthiness agenda must therefore foreground accountability as a first-order design and governance problem.
It is argued that while AI offers efficiency and scale, it simultaneously amplifies risks of discrimination, erodes perceived justice, demands new governance architectures, and necessitates a fundamental reorientation of HR competencies toward judgment, ethics, oversight, and human-centric capabilities.
Saloni Singhal Garg· International Journal of Lat...· 0 citations
This qualitative study conducts a comparative document analysis of ten influential governance instruments issued by UNESCO, the OECD, the European Union, the Council of Europe, the United States National Institute of Standards and Technology, the United Kingdom, the Group of Seven, and Singapore.
Kwan-Hong Tan· Open Access Journal of Multi...· 0 citations
The central claim is that constitutional and democratic requirements should not be treated as external compliance burdens when embedded into institutional design, they operate as productive constraints that improve legitimacy, implementation discipline, and the long-term trustworthiness of AI-enabled public decision-ma...
C. Oliveira· Open Access Journal of Data...· 0 citations
The findings show that meaningful oversight is not a single human approval step and is a lifecycle capability that combines bounded autonomy, evidence-based escalation, stop authority, continuous validation, audit records, and institutional learning.
Aaron K Montgomery, Hannah E Gallagher, Derrick L Mercer· International Journal of Eng...· 0 citations
Abstract The integration of Artificial Intelligence (AI) into competition authorities to detect anti-competitive practices entails inherent ethical risks, such as algorithmic bias and excessive dependence on technology providers. To mitigate these risks, this article investigates how thirty-five regulatory authorities,...
Mayla Cristina Costa Maroni Saraiva, Fátima de Souza Freire· Revista de Administración Pú...· 0 citations
The effectiveness and the moral credibility of the European Union’s Artificial Intelligence Act will be decided less by its substantive provisions than by the national institutions charged with enforcing them. This article examines Germany’s KI-Marktüberwachungs- und Innovationsförderungsgesetz (KI-MIG), adopted by the...
Fabian M. Teichmann· AI and Ethics· 0 citations
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