Existing agent benchmarks ask whether the agent finished the task. We ask whether it finished it within policy. We introduce Fiducia-bench, a benchmark for the governability of financial agents---whether they escalate when obligated, abstain when required, and leave an auditable trail---and use it to study a question no prior benchmark addresses: does decomposing an agent into components degrade its governance? It does, and the mechanism is specific. Policy-relevant facts discovered by one component are attenuated at the handoff boundary before reaching the component that must act on them. In a 626-episode experiment across 100 KYC/AML task variants, two models, and three architectures, a 32B open-weights model attenuated 0% of discovered facts under a single-loop baseline, 56% under a fixed pipeline, and 85% under an orchestrator-subagent architecture (all at constraint distance 2). A stronger model (gpt-4.1-mini) attenuated 3-6% under the same conditions, suggesting the governance cost of decomposition is partly a function of model capability. Critically, the same mechanism produces both under-escalation and over-escalation, depending on whether the dropped fact was a risk signal or an exculpating one. The benchmark, all tasks, and the verification harness are open-source
No specification says how a governed autotelic AI agent organization, where agents pursue self-generated goals inside guardrails, should be designed and evaluated. We answer in two parts. First, we synthesize the Governed Autotelic Multi-Agent Product Organization (GAMPO) framework from a document-based qualitative evi...
This work develops a multilevel governance theory for agentic AI and test its mechanisms in three studies over nine model versions, from a three-billion-parameter local model to a commercial frontier system.
This work evaluates SEADS against five re-implemented baselines on two US equity panels using this standard: no single metric ranks the systems consistently, motivating evaluation on multiple axes at once.
Ying-Jian Pan, Xiao-Wei Ding, Kay Giesecke· 0 citations
Policy evaluation often estimates direct benefits and costs while treating the institutional environment as fixed. In practice, a policy changes the system it enters: actors adapt, enforcement capacity shifts, burdens move, and new equilibria form around capture, gaming, compliance theater, irreversibility, and repair...
Multi-agent federations need governance that answers three questions under adversarial conditions: who participated (identity), did they conform (enforcement), and who decides (authority). A separate question is whether the verification machinery that polices a federation's outputs can also steer a generate-and-test lo...
SAGE-Fin is presented, a finance-specific authority-handoff contract that makes the proposed effect, not merely its text, the object of runtime control, and its results establish executable conformance, not independent safety accuracy.
Rui Tang, Qiang Liu, Yi-Chi Zhang et al.· 0 citations
We use cookies to run the site and, with your consent, for analytics and to show ads.
See our Cookie Policy.