This paper investigates the strategic and welfare properties of endogenous population partitioning (secession) within large-population anonymous games featuring strategic heterogeneity. We consider a continuum-player framework with a binary action space where players are categorized either as fol- lowers, who experience positive network externalities from conformity, or as contrarians, who seek distinctiveness via anti-conformism. We fully characterize the set of Nash equilibria and establish con- ditions under which costless secession yields structural Pareto improvements. We demonstrate that in any strategically mixed society, every mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium admits a Pareto-improving se- cession. With finitely many types, secession systematically mitigates coordination frictions, enhancing both individual payoffs and aggregate utility. Furthermore, we characterize social planner configura- tions optimizing weighted aggregate utility, establishing a formal mathematical isomorphism between optimal jurisdictional design and the theory of Bayesian persuasion solved via concavification. Finally, we derive the structural conditions governing migration stability when subgroups can unilaterally re- locate across distinct societies.
Can altruism serve as the behavioral foundation for efficient institutional design? We study full implementation in Berge equilibrium, the solution concept that formalizes strategic altruism: each agent's opponents collectively maximize her payoff. While Berge equilibrium resolves the Prisoner's Dilemma and can elimina...
Foivos Savva, M. Lombardi, Ritesh Jain· 0 citations
Majoritarian democracy is widely regarded as the canonical procedure for converting heterogeneous individual preferences into collective decisions, yet its welfare properties are far more fragile than legal and political theorists suggest. This paper contributes to the literature on the limits of majoritarianism by a...
Barbara Luppi, F. Parisi· Public Choice· 0 citations
The main findings demonstrate that individuals update strategies primarily through self-adjustment based on historical payoffs, with imitation playing merely an auxiliary role and the optimal self-adjustment proportion is approximately 0.9, and low sensitivity coefficients and mutation rates favor the emergence of coop...
Hao-Chen Wu, Meng-Cheng Sun, Lu-He Yang et al.· Games· 0 citations
We study a mechanism of cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma (PD). Incorporating social preferences as efficiency concerns into the PD game, we study how altruism translates into cooperation. Under complete information, cooperation requires the opponent's altruism to clear a threshold. We then introduce a subjective e...
Which social norms are self-correcting under rational learning? We show that conduct sustained by false beliefs cannot persist if a single departure from prevailing behavior generates evidence against those beliefs. We study the overlapping-generations learning model of Fudenberg and Levine (1993), in which finitely li...
Strategic decision-making in networked systems unfolds sequentially, with each agent’s choice shaped by the observable actions of those who decide earlier. We extend bounded rationality from simultaneous to sequential decision structures on scale-free networks, showing how modified backward induction yields approximate...
Chulwook Park· Scientific Reports· 0 citations
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