Service Enhancement and Reliability Assurance in 6G Vehicular Networks via a Stackelberg Game-Theoretic Approach

Abstract

With the rapid development of 6G and Internet of Vehicles (IoV) technologies, the volume of computation-intensive tasks generated by intelligent vehicles is growing exponentially. Given limited onboard processing capabilities, vehicles increasingly rely on edge servers deployed by service providers (SPs) at roadside units to offload tasks. Vehicle clients can offload the tasks to SPs to mitigate their onboard computation load, while SPs derive economic benefits through the provision of computation resources. However, this interaction introduces a conflict of interest, as vehicles aim to minimize their offloading costs, while SPs seek to maximize revenue. To address this problem, we propose SPOR, a Stackelberg game-based service priority-aware computation offloading and resource pricing scheme in IoV. SPOR is a hierarchical game-theoretic framework in which SPs act as leaders setting prices, while vehicles act as followers determining their offloading strategies. A novel service prioritization function is introduced, incorporating booking price, system load, and reputation to ensure fair and balanced resource allocation. We provide a theoretical proof of the existence and uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium. Extensive experiments on a real-world vehicle edge computing dataset show that SPOR outperforms baseline methods in delay, energy consumption, average load, and task completion rate. Notably, SPOR maintains task completion rates above 97% even under heavy workloads, demonstrating its effectiveness in enhancing system reliability and overall performance.