Convergence is measured against a human reference nobody built for the purpose -- 2,523 reader mark sets across 120 web documents, produced by people highlighting for their own reasons on a platform where the overlay of others'marks is off by default.
Abstract
Claims that language models homogenise are usually measured against human judgements collected for the study, which makes the human side an artifact of the design: a crowdworker given the model's instruction is running the model's prompt. We measure convergence against a human reference nobody built for the purpose -- 2,523 reader mark sets across 120 web documents, produced by people highlighting for their own reasons on a platform where the overlay of others'marks is off by default. Agreement is the overlap between two size-matched sentence sets minus the overlap expected when each is resampled within its own depth-and-length bands. The null's calibration is demonstrated, not asserted: every pair involving a random baseline lands within 0.006 of zero. On the median document each party names 14 sentences of 70; two readers share 4.1 and two models 8.7. Across 18 model arms spanning 11 vendors, 3 countries and both weight regimes, the median of 153 model pairs is +0.093 against a human yardstick of +0.040, and 99 sit entirely above the human interval. Two frontier models from rival labs reach +0.203, twice what GPT-4o agrees with itself on a second call. The effect is not determinism, prompt wording, procedure, vendor or routing, and it is graded: the smallest models agree at the human level. No model agrees with readers detectably more than a reader does, and at equal depth and length no surface feature separates their choices. The multiples are procedure-dependent and the ordering is not: models are cut to their sharpest set while a reader's is a random draw from what they marked, and blunting the models alike halves the gap without closing it. Tested out of sample on four models released after this analysis, against predictions fixed beforehand, none clears the human interval. A population simulated from several models is not several populations.
Benevolence bias is identified and measure, a small but consistent tendency for aligned LLMs to lean toward the kinder, safer, more socially approved answer on value-laden survey questions, and is easy to diagnose and straightforward to fix.
Yuanzi Li, Jun-Hao Wang, Minghui Liu et al.· 0 citations
This work evaluates 21 instruction-tuned LLM runs under a fixed ranked-response protocol, showing that models often locate the correct motivational region while ranking close alternatives unstably, and motivates value-recognition evaluation that combines exact accuracy, ranked recovery, and directed error analysis.
A. Chetvergov, S. Ukolov, Timofei Sivoraksha et al.· arXiv.org· 0 citations
Professional communication is increasingly mediated by LLMs - but do these models serve all users equally? We show that when prompts contain linguistic features more commonly used by women (hedges, tag questions, collective reference), they systematically elicit shorter, less sophisticated, and less formal responses across three document types and four models. These effects persist after controlling for prompt complexity and feature carry-over. Explicit gender cues like sign-off names are encoded in the same representational space as linguistic dialect - suggesting shared underlying mechanisms - yet linguistic register is far more influential, producing large, consistent effects where names produce none. Our results further reveal that post-hoc mitigation is challenging: because these patterns are culturally embedded and outside conscious control, users cannot easily avoid them through strategic self-presentation, and mechanistic analysis reveals that linguistic features are encoded in early transformer layers and entangled with other features. Our work calls for upstream consideration of the influences of linguistic variation to mitigate disparate impacts of LLM-mediated workplace communication.
Preference benchmarks are built by hiring annotators, and the identity of those annotators is treated as an implementation detail. We measure what that detail buys. On the 2,885 MultiPref items where both pools are internally unanimous, so no tie-breaking convention is consulted at all, expert and crowd annotators assign a different majority label to 23.6% and name the opposite winner on 9.2%; on the 246 comparably unanimous MT-Bench cells, benchmark authors and recruited experts differ on 30.5% and reverse on 8.5%. Yet on both corpora the resulting model leaderboards are bit-identical: Kendall tau = 1.00 with zero of six models displaced. That invariance is far weaker evidence than it looks, and we quantify how weak. Switching pools moves a model's win rate by 1.9pp (SD), one adjacent pair in our own leaderboard sits 0.8pp apart and had a 38% chance of swapping, and an item-level bootstrap displaces at least one model in 28% of resamples. The observed zero is the common outcome, not a property of aggregation: on the same measured perturbation, a ten-model leaderboard is displaced with probability 0.86 and a twenty-model leaderboard with probability 0.9997. Reporting a six-model leaderboard is safe; the safety does not generalise, and everything that consumes labels per item is not safe at any size. We make the distinction precise, show that a widely used dataset's stated assumption of no intra-group annotator variability is false, and show that an LLM judge tracks the crowd pool over the expert pool on all three models we test, including one from a different vendor. All code, per-call outputs, and pre-registered decision rules will be released upon acceptance.
Item-sensitivity, defined as whether a model's choice depends on the specific input rather than on its own output prior, is widely reported as evidence of task competence. We show this evidence is necessary but not sufficient using a forced-choice signalling task abstracted from the board game Deception: Murder in Hong Kong. In this environment, the reference points against which a coordinate should be judged (a fit-maximising strategy, a posterior-maximising strategy, and uniform random selection) are all computable in closed form. Across seven language models, two model families, a post-training ablation, and three independent scoring rules, every one of 21 model-by-rule cells is reliably item-sensitive. Yet 8 of those 21 cells are not statistically distinguishable from a chooser that ignores the item and selects at random, and 5 score worse than random at describing the target. Item-sensitivity and distance from random correlate at only r = 0.30. We call this consistency without alignment and argue it generalises to any evaluation that relies on item-sensitivity, permutation consistency, or self-consistency without an independent reference for the measured quantity. We further find that a literal-similarity baseline with no pragmatics outperforms most tested language models, that adding a pragmatic layer over two baseline similarity sources moves choosers toward random rather than toward the Bayesian reference, and that a standard labelled multiple-choice format carries no measurable content signal here. All results represent the model side of a pre-registered instrument; a matched human condition is designed and piloted but not yet collected.
The Cross-Lingual Comprehension Gap (CLCG) is defined as the reduction in response quality when the same content and question are presented in a target language rather than in English.
R. D. Da Silva, Jeffrey D. Eicher· 0 citations
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