Sep 2026· Journal of Applied Economics and Policy Studies· 0 citations
Abstract
Faced with a credibility crisis, the Voluntary Carbon Market (VCM) increasingly relies on satellite monitoring, blockchain registries, and digital MRV to strengthen transparency and rebuild trust. This paper questions that approach. Information economics holds that signals distinguish quality only when costly to falsify, but digital verification lowers the cost of producing verifiable records for genuine and fraudulent projects alike, so more transparency does not automatically mean more credibility. The paper argues that trustworthy market signals depend on three governance conditions holding at once, data governance independent of commercial interests, enforceable liability for misreporting, and genuine buyer demand for quality. Using a Most Similar Systems Design (MSSD), it compares the international VCM under the Integrity Council, the EU ETS, and China's relaunched Certified Emission Reduction (CCER) mechanism, with within-case analysis through process tracing. All three cases use comparable digital tools, and in all three the party being verified pays for verification, so technology and payment structure function as controls and the real variation lies in governance conditions. First, the key discretion over how many credits are issued lies in setting the counterfactual, which cannot be directly measured, so improving measurement accuracy does not resolve the core problem. Second, liability constrains this discretion, and its presence shows through whether an auditable ledger exists, that is, whether the gap between what should have been sanctioned and what actually was can be calculated. When the three conditions fail to hold together, more abundant and continuous data still produces performative transparency rather than structural integrity.
Although the voluntary carbon market (VCM) converts mitigation and removal outcomes into tradable credits, concerns about additionality, measurement, reporting and verification (MRV), double counting and credit quality continue to constrain credibility. The same integrity requirements can increase the data, expertise a...
Descentralised and international yet offering unmatched openness and efficiency, distributed ledger technology promotes criminal financing, market abuse, and insufficient consumer protection. The rapidly increasing number of blockchain-based digital assets throws down a challenge to regulation. Through conceptual analy...
Israel Tega Golley, B. Okocha· British journal of multidisc...· 0 citations
This article examines how blockchain technology may improve supply-chain auditing by strengthening traceability, evidential integrity, and the timeliness of accounting information while reducing information asymmetry among suppliers, focal firms, auditors, lenders, and investors. It develops an accounting-centered fram...
Syamsul Hidayat, Ming-Sheng Fang· Advanced Business Journal· 0 citations
Determining when not to adopt blockchain or distributed ledger technology (DLT) remains difficult, especially in public-sector and social-good initiatives where unjustified experimentation can waste scarce resources, increase compliance burden, and weaken institutional accountability. This paper presents a compact, evi...
Silvio Meneguzzo, Stefano Leto, Noemi Romani et al.· Proceedings of the 2026 Inte...· 0 citations
The ambiguity surrounding the impact of digital transformation on banking sustainability is an aggregation artifact. Analyzing 250 banks across 25 emerging markets (2015–2024) using fixed effects, we demonstrate that digitalization exerts opposing forces on environmental, social, and governance (ESG) pillars that can...
B. Dorsaf, Boussaada Rim· Thunderbird International Bu...· 0 citations
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