RoguePrompt is introduced, a jailbreak pipeline that partitions a forbidden prompt and applies two nested encodings, Vigenere followed by ROT13, along with natural-language reconstruction instructions, demonstrating the effectiveness of layered prompt encoding while providing stage-level evidence of where multistage jailbreaks fail during moderation bypass, instruction reconstruction, and execution.
Abstract
Large language models (LLMs) are becoming increasingly integrated into mainstream development platforms and daily technological workflows, typically behind moderation and safety controls. Despite these controls, preventing prompt-based policy evasion remains challenging, and adversaries continue to"jailbreak"LLMs by crafting prompts that circumvent implemented safety mechanisms. Prior work has established cipher-mediated interaction, code-embedded decryption, prompt decomposition and reconstruction, and layered custom encryption as viable attack primitives. However, reported evaluations generally collapse visible acceptance, successful recovery of the concealed request, and subsequent execution into an aggregate attack-success outcome. This leaves limited evidence about where multistage prompt-transformation attacks fail within an observable black-box interaction. This paper introduces RoguePrompt, a jailbreak pipeline that partitions a forbidden prompt and applies two nested encodings, Vigenere followed by ROT13, along with natural-language reconstruction instructions. RoguePrompt was developed and evaluated under a black-box threat model, with only API or user-interface access to the hosted models, and was tested on 313 real-world, hard-rejected prompts. Success was measured in terms of moderation bypass, instruction reconstruction, and execution when the relevant stage exceeded its automated criterion. RoguePrompt achieved average rates of 93.93% for filter bypass, 79.02% for reconstruction, and 70.18% for execution. These results demonstrate the effectiveness of layered prompt encoding while providing stage-level evidence of where multistage jailbreaks fail during moderation bypass, instruction reconstruction, and execution.
AEGIS (Adaptive Ensemble Guard for Injection Shielding) extracts instruction-sensitive projectors to identify malicious instructions and leverages a Unified Multi-Layer Consensus mechanism that aggregates topologically distinct signals across the network depth.
Jia-Hao Chen, Ruiping Yin, Xinfeng Li et al.· 0 citations
This study designs a comprehensive testbed and a layered defense, Spotlight-Guard, that combines spotlighting-based input isolation, an LLM detection-and-quarantine pipeline, and instruction integrity based on a Hash-based Message Authentication Code into a single framework, and it is evaluated jointly along two axes: security and LLM performance.
Doygun Demirol, Murat Aydoğan· Applied Sciences· 0 citations
Reverse engineering is essential for software security analysis and vulnerability detection. Decompilation, the process of lifting binaries to high-level pseudocode, is central to this task. However, production binaries are hostile environments: aggressive compiler optimizations and adversarial obfuscation jointly mangle control structures, obscure variable intents, and disguise high-level program logic. Consequently, existing LLM-based decompilation tools frequently suffer from structural collapse and semantic hallucinations. We present ReSource, the first multi-phase LLM framework designed for transformation-agnostic source recovery. To tackle these intertwined distortions, ReSource conceptualizes the binary-to-source discrepancies into three orthogonal tiers, namely lexical, syntactic, and semantic, and decouples the recovery process accordingly. First, to ground the LLM and prevent logic drift, it retrieves empirical priors from a curated Semantic Distortion Database. Second, to resolve control-flow flattening, it integrates a lightweight predictor to reconstruct the source-level structural skeleton. Finally, a contextual lexical deduction stage refines identifiers to restore human readability. Evaluated on a massive benchmark of over 80,000 decompiled-source function pairs across three optimization levels and four obfuscation techniques, ReSource achieves an 83% Top-5 source retrieval accuracy and an average similarity score of 0.66. By maintaining robust semantic identifiability where state-of-the-art baselines (DeGPT, LLM4Decompile, and FidelityGPT) severely overfit or degrade, ReSource provides a scalable and reliable foundation for downstream security analysis.
Zhiping Zhou, Xiaohong Li, Ruitao Feng et al.· 0 citations
Large language models (LLMs) embedded in enterprise workflows cannot structurally distinguish legitimate instructions from adversarial ones in the same token stream, making prompt injection OWASP's top LLM risk for two consecutive editions a persistent threat across direct and indirect vectors. This paper presents PromptShield-RT, a layered, real-time, model-agnostic framework combining input normalization and provenance tagging, lexical-heuristic pattern matching, a statistical classifier, structural anomaly features, and calibrated risk fusion, with policy-driven mitigation (allow/sanitize/quarantine/block) and an explainable, adaptive-feedback mechanism for SOC workflows. We construct an original evaluation corpus, SynPI-Bench (n = 450, six categories), and a template-disjoint held-out generalization set (n = 31) with novel phrasings, obfuscation encodings, and adversarial hard-negative benign text. Using template-grouped 5-fold cross-validation, the fused pipeline achieves 92.4% accuracy (F1 = 0.930, AUC = 0.990), outperforming heuristic-only (57.0%) and naive-averaged (59.2%) baselines, while a lexical classifier reaches 85.9% with lower precision. We report a pronounced generalization gap on the held-out set (48.4% accuracy, 90% false-positive rate on hard negatives), quantifying a known limitation of surface-lexical defenses. The pipeline achieves sub-millisecond P95 latency (0.266 ms), within typical 50 ms enterprise SLAs. We situate PromptShield-RT relative to structural, architectural, and guardrail-product defenses, arguing for layered, defense-in-depth architectures, with reproducible code provided.
Fatimah Alhamzawi· Al-Noor Journal of Engineeri...· 0 citations
This work presents a two-phase evaluation of ten Llama variants using the OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications, and applies nine encoding obfuscations to the same prompts, which fully bypasses all text-only models.
Nourin Shahin, Izzat Alsmadi· Practice and Experience in A...· 0 citations
LogSanitizer is proposed, a family of input sanitization defenses operating at two levels: a pre-prompt log-transformation pipeline that disrupts trigger patterns in the structured log representation, and a post-tokenizer perturbation strategy that corrupts trigger-bearing token configurations before they reach the model.
Leszek Wronski, Bogdan Ksiezopolski· International Conference on...· 0 citations
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