A Will to Interpret: Embodied Moral Reflexivity Under Misrecognition
Abstract
This article reinterprets Pierre Bourdieu's theory of practice as a framework for understanding the moral struggles of marginalised actors in everyday contexts. Growing scholarship has emphasised that moral practices encompass not only intentional and deliberative reasoning but also automatic, instant and embodied reactions. Building on this literature, this article demonstrates how morality, as moral habitus and embodied dispositions, can subtly influence the dominant morals and norms throughout individual negotiations with habitus. In particular, it reframes Bourdieu's notion of practical reflection as a will to interpret —a pre‐reflective, practically oriented process of moral orientation that arises from embodied dissonance under conditions of misrecognition. Based on this concept, the article identifies two key sites where Bourdieu's theory contributes to moral struggles: (a) the experiential gap produced by hysteresis and (b) the development of new moral languages among marginalised actors. Ultimately, it calls for greater attention to the subtle, slow and often unnoticeable forms of resistance that unfold in everyday life, quietly reshaping moral landscapes from within.