Skip to content

When to Limit the Market

Aug 2026 · Business Ethics Journal Review · pp. 32-37 · 0 citations

Abstract

Gregory Robson (2023) argues that a moral objection to the market is successful only if it shows that a representative sample of business activity is unethical. He calls this the Normative Representativeness Requirement (NRR). I argue that we should not endorse the NRR for two reasons. First, an objection can be successful even if it fails to satisfy the NRR. Second, Robson motivates the NRR by appealing to a general epistemic requirement against hasty generalizations, yet this epistemic requirement only applies when one attempts a generalization—and objections to markets need not do so.

View source

Similar papers

Open access Sep 2026

Different articles, similar arguments: A response to Rosenberg

In this short response to Rosenberg (2026), we focus on three points. First, we note that there is now agreement that intra-party sortition is unlikely to deliver a more socially representative legislature without some other measures such as stratification or quotas. Second, we argue that it is curious to criticise us...

Philip Cowley, Tim Bale · 0 citations
Open access Sep 2026

Markets and Moral Formation: It’s Time for an Empirical Turn

To date, arguments about how markets morally form us have tended to be theoretical in nature, relying on anecdotes and contestable philosophical interpretations of economic concepts and practices. This has often resulted in the two sides speaking past each other. This essay argues that it is time to move the discussion...

Christina G. McRorie · 0 citations
Open access Aug 2026

Moral uncertainty and imaginative resistance

There has been a recent surge of interest in normative internalism, according to which what you ought to do depends on your beliefs about morality. This view has potentially wide-reaching implications for practical action, policy choice, and societal norms. The view is motivated by certain compelling examples, but in...

Anna Mahtani · 0 citations
Review Open access Sep 2026

Unjust Aspects of the Epistemic Marketplace: Idea Appropriation, Bullshit, and Epistemic Injustice

Epistemic injustice happens when a subject is wronged in their “capacity as a knower.” This paper argues that speakers/writers and hearers/readers suffer epistemic injustice under two scenarios: idea appropriation and bullshitting. Epistemic injustice happens when a speaker or writer suffers idea appropriation, where...

J. A. Licon · 0 citations
Book Sep 2026

The Subjectivity of Value

This book is a sustained attack on the claim that values are objective, in the world independent of people’s attitudes. It evaluates this claim in different value domains: moral, personal or prudential, aesthetic, and general evaluative. The first section greatly expands on J.L. Mackie’s appeal to moral disagreement...

Alan H. Goldman · 0 citations

We use cookies to run the site and, with your consent, for analytics and to show ads. See our Cookie Policy.