Jul 2026· 2026 IEEE 27th China Conference on System Simulation Technology and its Applications (CCSSTA)· pp. 816-822· 0 citations· 12 references
Abstract
In the new power system integrated with high-penetration distributed renewable energy and electric vehicle (EV) clusters, traditional scheduling methods cannot adequately address the game interactions among multiple virtual power plants (VPPs) and the stochastic fluctuations in EV operational behaviors. This paper constructs a bi-level optimization framework based on the Stackelberg game theory. The upper-level model optimizes transaction electricity prices to maximize the profit of the VPP operator, while the lower-level model realizes internal scheduling for each sub-VPP with the objective of minimizing operational costs. This study innovatively integrates aggregated EV resources into the multi-VPP game framework. It characterizes the operational features of EVs, including travel demands and charging-discharging behaviors, and adopts adjustable robust coefficients to achieve quantitative management and control of uncertain risks. Case study results indicate that the proposed strategy can fully exploit the peak shaving potential of EVs. The dynamic pricing mechanism facilitates transactions among VPPs and effectively reduces the operational costs of all participants. Moreover, the robust optimization method significantly enhances the system’s anti-disturbance capacity, which enables the system to adapt to complex practical operation scenarios.
Modern power systems face new challenges in maintaining stability and real-time balance with the large-scale integration of intermittent renewable energy. To address the persistent issue of insufficient participation in demand-side management, this study proposes a three-tier Stackelberg game coordination framework for...
Yi-Xiao Wang, Yunhui Chen, Bobo Chen et al.· International Journal of Swa...· 0 citations
This paper proposes a bi-level game-theoretic framework for coordinating large-scale electric vehicles (EVs) in regional power grid deep peak regulation under a demand response mechanism. The upper-level model formulates a non-cooperative game among the deep peak regulation market operator (DPRMO), electric vehicle agg...
Liang Sun, Shuning Liu, Cui Dang et al.· Energies· 0 citations
The surging integration of volatile renewable energy severely exacerbates power grid frequency fluctuations, yet conventional frequency regulation (FR) market clearing mechanisms fail to efficiently coordinate heterogeneous energy storage systems (ESSs) due to the complete decoupling of multi-dimensional physical perfo...
Zhe-Kai Xu, Chun-Xiang Yang, Zi-Fen Han et al.· Energies· 0 citations
This paper proposes a tripartite hybrid game-theoretic pricing model for the vehicle-station-grid framework that accounts for the interest demands of all stakeholders. The model aims to balance interests among different stakeholders while guiding charging behavior of electric vehicle (EV) users within the context of gr...
Ning Zhang, Zhong-Qiang Zhang, Juan Yan et al.· IEEE Transactions on Automat...· 0 citations
With the large-scale integration of Electric Vehicles (EVs) into distribution systems, the spatiotemporal uncertainty of charging loads and the interplay between user charging behavior and network operational constraints present new challenges to the safe and economical operation of the power system. To address the ins...
Si-Zu Hou, Yao Sang, Xuan Zhao et al.· Energies· 0 citations
With the global low-carbon transition and increasing wind and photovoltaic penetration, virtual power plant (VPP) scheduling increasingly requires coordinated low-carbon operation, resource management, and long-term stability. Existing studies often treat demand response (DR) resources as passive adjustable capacity, b...
Yi Huang, Yun Zhu· Energies· 0 citations
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