Knowing the Unknown: Metaphor and Science in Aristotle, Kant and Hanson

Abstract

The relationship between metaphor and science is commonly understood as one of opposition: whereas scientific knowledge aspires to literal precision, metaphor is often regarded as a merely rhetorical or pedagogical device. This paper challenges that assumption by arguing that metaphor performs a constitutive epistemic function whenever scientific inquiry confronts phenomena that exceed the available conceptual framework. Rather than serving only to communicate established knowledge, metaphor enables the exploration of the unknown by providing new ways of organizing experience and guiding observation. To defend this thesis, the paper develops a systematic—rather than historical—dialogue between Kant, Norwood Russell Hanson, and Aristotle. Kant’s account of symbolic hypotyposis shows how metaphorical thinking becomes necessary when mechanistic explanation reaches its limits. Hanson’s theory-ladenness of observation explains how such metaphorical frameworks reorganize perception itself, making possible new modes of seeing. Finally, Aristotle’s theory of metaphor reveals the cognitive mechanism underlying both accounts by conceiving metaphor as the recognition of objective similarities capable of extending knowledge. Despite their different philosophical commitments, all three thinkers converge on the idea that metaphor is not external to scientific rationality but one of the conditions that make scientific discovery possible.