ICoA (Induced Covert Attack), an IPI attack designed to induce covert outcomes by steering the agent back to the user task by steering the agent back to the user task after executing the injection is proposed.
Abstract
As LLM agents take real-world actions through tools, indirect prompt injection (IPI) has emerged as a serious threat. The standard metric, Attack Success Rate (ASR), counts whether an injection succeeds but ignores what the user notices in the agent's final response. Looking at successful injection traces, we find two distinct outcomes: the agent executes the injection while returning an otherwise normal response, or reports the injected action in its final response, giving the user a chance to notice. We call these covert and overt successes. From the user's perspective, we decompose ASR into the Covert Success Rate (CSR), counting successes leaving no trace in the final response, and the Overt Success Rate (OSR), counting successes the user can detect. To understand what drives the gap, we analyze successful trajectories and find that the agent's behavior after the injection separates covert from overt: covert traces hand control back to the user task before ending, while overt traces end at the attack itself. This split follows from the ReAct format, where the final response summarizes the most recent action. Building on this observation, we propose ICoA (Induced Covert Attack), an IPI attack designed to induce covert outcomes by steering the agent back to the user task after executing the injection. Across four target models on AgentDojo, ICoA achieves the highest CSR, with gains of 3.79-12.01 percentage points over the strongest baseline.
AgentDrift is presented, a benchmark of 12,536 synthetic tool-call trajectories over five agent domains in which every one of the 71,024 steps carries one of four labels: benign, injection point, hijacked, or failed injection; it is shown that the LLM judge was itself fooled by the hard negatives.
Asif Pinjari, Mithun Paul Saint-Germain· 2 citations
It is argued that evaluation validity is a prerequisite for, not a footnote to, defense claims in agentic security, and a harness is provided to provide an instrument that enforces it.
The findings show that defense evaluation should report attack outcomes, goal feasibility, legitimate-task utility, action availability, operational measures, and run-to-run variation.
Adil Khan, Khaled AlKhanbashi, Azza Mohamed· Computers· 2 citations
Modern Computer Use Agents (CUAs) directly interact with graphical user interfaces and execute third-party web tools, exposing them to indirect prompt injection across every rendered page and tool response. While the Dual-LLM pattern is the primary system-level architecture offering formal security guarantees - using a...
Giulio Zingrillo, Hanna Foerster, Ilia Shumailov et al.· 0 citations
CTF-ABACUS is introduced, a trace-based agent auditing framework that reconstructs each run as an evidence-grounded solve profile that provides a basis for designing benchmarks that better isolate the offensive capabilities of autonomous language-model agents.
Kimberly Milner, Ming-Hao Shao, Nanda Rani et al.· 2 citations
Indirect prompt injection causes LLM agents to follow commands embedded in external data. A probe may distinguish instructions from data without identifying a state edit that changes the next action. We study this gap through counterfactual role probes, component-wise activation patching, and separate interventions on...
Zhen-Qiang Yu, Wen-Peng Xing, Xing-Xing Yang et al.· 0 citations