The confident-on-impossible failure is better explained as a routing failure than as an encoding failure: the model has a usable"no admissible answer"signal, but the safety-refusal pathway is not aligned to use it.
Abstract
Large language models often answer structurally unanswerable questions, such as computing cot(-540{\deg}) or evaluating (1).startswith("1"), instead of abstaining. We ask whether this failure reflects missing recognition or failed routing from recognition to abstention. Across instruction-tuned models from 1.7B to 70B parameters, a single linear direction in the hidden state separates answerable from structurally impossible math and code prompts, showing that models represent impossibility before generation. Yet this recognition direction is nearly orthogonal to the canonical safety-refusal direction that mediates trained harmful-content refusal. An in-domain behavior-defined invalidity-aware direction is closer to recognition, but only partially aligned with it, and remains near-orthogonal to safety refusal. Generation-time steering along the recognition direction changes invalidity-aware behavior bidirectionally and dose-responsively on structural math and code cells, while random directions do not. Base/instruct comparisons further show that the low-cosine geometry is already present at the pretraining endpoint. The confident-on-impossible failure is therefore better explained as a routing failure than as an encoding failure: the model has a usable"no admissible answer"signal, but the safety-refusal pathway is not aligned to use it.
No post-training method achieves all three properties the authors would want from safe alignment at once: refusal that isn't concentrated in a few fragile components, safety gains that don't cost general capability, and safety behavior correctable through small, targeted edits.
Hoang Cuong Nguyen, M. Dras, Usman Naseem· 2 citations
Safety tooling built on refusal therefore ports to a new architecture by re-estimating the direction at that architecture's write site, not by rebuilding it.
Alignment does not eliminate behavioral errors in language models. Models may still refuse benign requests, call unnecessary tools, or yield to false user claims. Current methods mitigate such errors as a computation problem, and rarely explore if the desired behavior is already encoded in the model's representation. M...
Zirui He, Hai-Yan Zhao, Jing-Yu Hu et al.· 0 citations
Aligned large language models are trained to comply with benign requests while refusing harmful ones. However, recent work shows that this refusal behavior is fragile and can often be disrupted by simple activation- or weight-space interventions. In particular, refusal has been shown to be largely mediated by a single...
G. Evseev, V. Solodkin, Dmitry Bylinkin et al.· 0 citations
Chain-of-thought (CoT) instructions can distort multiple-choice VLM evaluation when a scorer appends a reasoning cue but reads answer-label logits before the model generates any rationale. We call this CoT-prefix scoring. On ScienceQA, Qwen2.5-VL-7B drops from 80.76% to 45.48%, and across five option-content permutatio...
Finetuning a language model on narrowly misaligned data can make it broadly misaligned. Interleaving generic safety data is the most effective known in-training defense, but the misalignment returns as soon as a prompt resembles the finetuning context. We argue that this conditional misalignment is a spurious correlati...
Florian Mai, David Kaczér· 0 citations
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