2026· Computers, Materials & Continua· pp. 1-10· 0 citations· 41 references
TL;DR
Mixed results of RACE-SOC show why agent count, prompt view, aggregation, aggregation, and risk must be audited together and is a reproducible evaluation instrument for exposing these configuration boundaries in SOC triage.
Abstract
: Large language model (LLM) agents are now being used in security operations center (SOC) workflows to summarise security alerts, support triage, and suggest escalation or containment measures. Existing evaluations tend to focus on answer quality or benchmark accuracy, while the operational risks of multi-agent coordination are not clearly exposed. This gap is problematic in SOC triage because extra agents may produce unsupported claims, disagreement, false consensus, or unsafe operations even when the final answer seems reasonable. This paper proposes RACE-SOC, a Risk-constrained Auditable Coordination Evaluation protocol for LLM-based multi-agent SOC triage. RACE-SOC evaluates bundled role-conditioned configurations over fixed source groups by scoring the trade-off among triage utility, coordination risk, and token cost. The corrected deterministic scorer combines utility terms with a K-invariant primary risk score based on bounded unsafe-output incidence and unsupported-claim rate; coordination-only disagreement and false-consensus terms are reported separately. Across 45 model–dataset–seed cells, the corrected operational selections are K = 1/5/10 in 13/14/18 cells, including seven K = 5/K = 10 co-best cells resolved by a preregistered cost-first tie-break. Each sampling seed realizes n = 28 source groups (6/6/4/6/6 across the five datasets), giving 84 seed-indexed observations but only 54 distinct alert-set signatures with overlap; these are not statistically independent population samples. We instantiate the protocol on five public cybersecurity datasets and compare Qwen3.5-9B local inference, GLM-5.2, and DeepSeek-v4-pro. We also add a matched same-temperature repeated-inference control at K = 5 and K = 10 to separate repeated sampling from the role-conditioned pipeline. The control obtains a higher mean net score in five of six model–K strata, while the role-conditioned pipeline is higher for GLM-5.2 at K = 10. The direction of all six comparisons is retained after unique-signature weighting and after excluding plurality ties. These mixed results do not support a general benefit from role specialization under the tested design. Instead, they show why agent count, prompt view, aggregation, and risk must be audited together. The contribution of RACE-SOC is a reproducible evaluation instrument for exposing these configuration boundaries in SOC triage rather than assuming that more roles are inherently better.
Maat is presented, a runtime governance layer that validates agent-to-agent handoffs against a versioned workflow contract, or anchor, with no language model in the validation or scoring path and the results support deterministic handoff validation for contract-expressible defects.
This work systematizes MAS security through an execution-centered analysis of 197 works, introducing an A-I-R framework that organizes attacks by adversary position, interaction interface, and resulting system-level risk, unifying otherwise fragmented attack mechanisms across MAS.
Rui Yang, Jun-Jie Xu, Zheng-Yu Liu et al.· 3 citations
It is shown that standard single-layer defenses each fail on their own and can even backfire, and called on the community to move beyond per-model alignment and toward composite safety mechanisms before multi-agent LLM systems are deployed at scale.
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SOC-in-a-Box, a multi-agent prototype that automates the three core SOC functions—detection, investigation, and response—using specialised AI agents powered by a large language model (LLM), demonstrates that a self-contained, locally deployable multi-agent architecture can meaningfully reduce manual effort in routine S...
D. S, Pallavi U, K. Devika· International Research Journ...· 0 citations
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Despite the wide adoption of Large Language Models (LLMs) and AI agents in cybersecurity, the impact of agent topology on autonomous cyber operations (ACO) performance remains underexplored. Current agent-based security systems rely on either monolithic LLM prompts or rigid, static pipelines. We present MaLO, a configu...
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