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Does Fine-Tuning Undo Activation Steering? Behavioural Recovery Without Weight-Edit Reversal

Aug 2026 · 0 citations · 29 references
Computer Science

TL;DR

This work studies the stability of embedded steering for refusal suppression and brevity induction across five instruction-tuned models (3B-14B) under non-adversarial SFT and RLHF.

Abstract

Activation steering can be embedded directly into a language model's weights, shaping behaviour without inference-time intervention and offering a way to encode alignment prior to release. However, models are routinely fine-tuned after deployment, and it is unknown whether embedded interventions survive this. We study the stability of embedded steering for refusal suppression and brevity induction across five instruction-tuned models (3B-14B) under non-adversarial SFT and RLHF. Behaviourally, preservation tracks the training data: steering degrades when optimisation pressure contradicts the targeted behaviour and persists otherwise, with refusal ablation losing 64% of its effect on average under SFT. Mechanistically, however, the weight edit survives almost untouched even where behaviour reverts: mean vector recovery is $\rho = 0.004$, and the fine-tuning update along the steering direction is near-orthogonal to its pre-edit weight pattern (mean $\cos\theta = 0.074$). When steered behaviour degrades, fine-tuning does not achieve it by dismantling or reversing the steering mechanism itself. Embedded steering is therefore mechanistically durable but functionally vulnerable, and requires behavioural re-validation after downstream training.

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