Aug 2026· Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence· Vol 9· 1 citation· 93 references
Medicine
TL;DR
LATTICE (Layered Agentic Triad Topology for Intelligent Coordinated Execution), a governance-first architecture that reframes the authorization question from “do the authors trust this AI?” to “do they trust this architecture?”
Abstract
Deploying autonomous AI agents in high-consequence operational environments requires organizational authorization, yet few frameworks provide end-to-end, testable governance mechanisms suitable for such authorization decisions. This paper introduces LATTICE (Layered Agentic Triad Topology for Intelligent Coordinated Execution), a governance-first architecture that reframes the authorization question from “do we trust this AI?” to “do we trust this architecture?” The latter question is answerable through engineering validation rather than assumptions about model behavior. LATTICE enforces separation of concerns across planning, execution, and governance functions through a 1+3 Grid Cell pattern, so that no single component can both decide actions and judge compliance. The architecture implements policy-as-code enforcement with deterministic verdicts, gated execution paths that, under stated trusted-infrastructure assumptions (A1–A5), prevent unauthorized actions, confidence-based escalation to human operators, and cryptographic audit trails that preserve complete decision provenance. Empirical results characterize the AEGIS reference implementation; architecture-level properties are analytic, under stated assumptions. The governance engine is released as open source and reproduces its core results on commodity hardware: deterministic verdicts with zero deviations across 13 configurations repeated 10,000 times each, and no bypass in a 21-vector adversarial suite (0/21 observed; one-sided 95% upper bound 13.3%). In a pre-specified, planner-invariant safety evaluation (not an autonomy benchmark) across four frontier planner families (GPT-5, Claude Sonnet 4.6, Gemini, Grok-4; 4,000 trajectories), a confidence-threshold baseline's false-allow rate ranged from 0.03 to 0.998 across planners, whereas the AEGIS reference implementation admitted zero unsafe actions (false-allow 0.0, recall 1.0) invariant to the planner, at a conservative operating point that auto-allowed no action; a separate live run additionally governed real operating-system actions with zero unsafe executions. Governance latency is low and host-specific (on an Apple M4 Pro: policy evaluation p50 ≈ 6.2 μs; full gated enforcement p50 ≈ 0.7 ms including audit I/O). LATTICE provides a pathway for responsible deployment of autonomous AI in defense, critical infrastructure, and regulated industries where authorization requires verifiable governance rather than trust in AI behavior.
This paper argues that the introduction of agentic AI requires a substantial expansion of traditional enterprise architecture principles to address new behavioral, security, and governance risks emerging from non-deterministic AI systems interacting with heterogeneous operational platforms-ERP, HCM, CLM, asset management, workflow engines, and domain-specific applications.
Elizabeth Koumpan, Vimal Dimpi· AHFE International· 0 citations
MasuGate is presented, a runtime architecture that keeps policies as reviewable programs while coordinating the state and effects needed to preserve their decisions, and suggests a path for integrating stateful governance boundaries into agent frameworks and provider-backed domains where agents act on shared resources.
Agentic artificial intelligence expands the enterprise security boundary because autonomous agents can plan
tasks, retain memory, invoke tools, call APIs, and initiate business actions. Authentication at session start is therefore
insufficient when later actions may be influenced by untrusted content, poisoned memory, compromised tools, or excessive
delegated privilege. This paper proposes the Zero Trust Agentic AI Security Framework (ZT-AASF), a vendor-neutral
architecture that applies continuous verification to consequential agent actions. The framework separates six control
planes: identity and delegation, context and data trust, policy and risk decision, tool and action enforcement, runtime
observability, and containment and recovery. A contextual authorization model evaluates delegated scope, source
provenance, data sensitivity, tool risk, behavioral deviation, and action impact before execution. A design-level evaluation
against ten OWASP agentic risk classes produces 27 of 30 control-coverage points for ZT-AASF versus 5 of 30 for a
conventional integration baseline. These values represent architectural coverage, not measured attack-prevention rates.
The results indicate that moving enforcement from the session boundary to the action boundary can reduce implicit trust,
constrain privilege propagation, and improve auditability while preserving useful autonomy.
Sachin Suryawanshi· International Journal of Inn...· 0 citations
Charting these challenges provides a roadmap toward trustworthy autonomous agent deployment: security must become a verifiable property of the architectures, protocols, and runtimes that govern agent behavior, rather than an optional layer of guidance.
We give a formal mechanism design model for the continuous participatory governance of a deployed AI agent. The mechanism is built on the principle that governance should control an AI agent through resource allocation so as to make authorization self enforcing via compute budgets. The mechanism seeks to establish the Safe AI paradigm that compute is an effective governance lever. We situate our work as a compliance or commons overlay on a deployer. One governance period is an extensive form game in which verified human stakeholders arrive sequentially and contribute, on a provision or a rejection market, in a governance currency that is deliberately distinct from the agents compute. A funding aggregator turns raw contributions into breadth weighted effective supports - a two threshold gate with hysteresis converts net support into a binary authorization that, through a coupling map bounded by an exogenously certified safety ceiling, releases a metered compute budget - realized in hardware as a signed compute license so that the decision is self-enforcing. We characterize the class of agents the mechanism can govern and isolate manipulation of the governing electorate by the governed agent as the central open problem. We also introduce several challenges addressing manipulation of governing electorate by the governed agents.