Aug 2026· IEEE Transactions on Pattern Analysis and Machine Intelligence· Vol PP· 0 citations
Medicine
TL;DR
This work introduces BadCLIP, a novel backdoor attack that leverages prompt learning to effectively inject malicious behaviors into CLIP models even in data-scarce scenarios and achieves high attack success rates while maintaining comparable accuracy on clean images.
Abstract
Recent studies have identified vulnerabilities in contrastive vision-language pre-training (CLIP) models to backdoor attacks. Attackers manipulate models to exhibit targeted behaviors upon encountering specific triggers while maintaining normal performance on clean inputs. Existing backdoor attacks on CLIP primarily focus on the pre-training stage or require extensive data for fine-tuning, which limits their practicality in few-shot transfer learning scenarios. In this work, we introduce BadCLIP, a novel backdoor attack that leverages prompt learning to effectively inject malicious behaviors into CLIP models even in data-scarce scenarios. Our BadCLIP operates under two different scenarios. (1) BadCLIP-W assumes white-box access to models and consists of a learnable trigger and a trigger-aware context generator. To optimize performance, we introduce a trigger warm-up strategy during training. (2) BadCLIP-B functions under black-box constraints to models. To enhance attack performance, we first generate a trigger pattern by a black-box optimization process due to the absence of gradient information. Then, we adopt the trigger pattern to poison the training datasets to inject backdoors via prompt learning. Comprehensive experiments demonstrate that BadCLIP-W and BadCLIP-B achieve high attack success rates while maintaining comparable accuracy on clean images.
BADERASER is proposed, a novel backdoor defense technique for backdoor elimination in neural code models that introduces code naturalness as an auxiliary constraint and incorporates statistical indicators in trigger inversion to improve the quality of recovered triggers.
Wei Cheng, Yu Zhou, Guang Yang et al.· International Conference on...· 0 citations
This work reveals that backdoor behaviors tend to be absorbed by a simpler parallel branch when jointly trained with the main network, and proposes Trapping and Removing (TR), a simple yet effective training-time defense that introduces a lightweight shortcut branch as a "honeypot" to trap backdoor knowledge.
Zixuan Zhu, Rui Wang, Lihua Jing et al.· 0 citations
DeCNIP (Defense with Critical Neuron Isolation Pruning), which leverages representational analysis to identify and neutralize backdoors in a unified pipeline, is introduced, which achieves over 95% relative reduction in Attack Success Rate (ASR), outperforming seven state-of-the-art defenses with only 0.1% neuron intervention.
Yuxi Li, Zhi-Bo Zhang, Kailong Wang et al.· arXiv.org· 0 citations
This work proposes ActivationBackdoor, an inference-time backdoor attack that composes two activation-level components for trigger detection and backdoor behavior injection, and shows that ActivationBackdoor attains attack success comparable to training-time backdoor baselines while preserving high clean-task accuracy and utility.
Zichun Su, Mi Zhang, Xiaohan Zhang et al.· Proceedings of the 32nd ACM...· 0 citations
BERM is introduced, a lightweight framework that performs in-situ detection by modeling a host LLM’s internal representations extracted during prefill, adding negligible overhead and reducing incremental inference overhead to near-zero.
Mask2Keep (M2K), an attack-enhancement training framework that improves backdoor robustness under compression-oriented pruning by encouraging the model to encode both task- and backdoor-related information into parameters that are less likely to be removed, is proposed.
Jing Shang, Jian Wang, Kailun Wang et al.· Neural Networks· 0 citations
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