Reasoning Jury, a system that replaces the single judge with a jury of LLMs and a moderated consensus mechanism, is introduced to improve the fidelity of judgments for identifying reasoning defects and can be leveraged to understand failure modes of reasoning LLMs on benchmarks, which allows much deeper understanding of a model's performance.
Abstract
Improving reasoning LLMs requires the ability to judge the quality of long reasoning traces for effective reasoning data curation, strong training signals during reinforcement learning, and an in-depth understanding of reasoning behaviors during model performance evaluation. Additionally, surfacing reasoning mistakes that the model makes would enable improving the model's performance at runtime through providing feedback. Due to the difficulty of this complex task on long reasoning traces, single-model judges (even frontier models) do not do well at identifying reasoning defects. Additionally, leveraging frontier models during online training of reasoning LLMs is generally prohibited due to guardrails in terms of use. In this work, we introduce Reasoning Jury, a system that replaces the single judge with a jury of LLMs and a moderated consensus mechanism, to improve the fidelity of judgments for identifying reasoning defects. In reasoning jury, defects of a reasoning trace and their severity are surfaced through a deliberation where a moderator conducts a discussion amongst the jury where the jurors critique each other's judgments and get to modify their initial votes. The moderator derives a consensus through deliberation amongst jurors or consolidation of judgements. We show that Reasoning Jury with a jury of open-weight models (e.g., gpt-oss-120b) is able to significantly outperform frontier models (opus-4.6, sonnet-4.6, and gemini-3.1-pro) at correctly identifying reasoning defects. Besides accuracy performance improvements, the aggregated cost of the jury (initial verdicts, deliberations, consolidation, etc.) is a fraction (8 to 15%) of the cost of running frontier models in LLM-as-a-judge setup. We also show how these judgements can be leveraged to understand failure modes of reasoning LLMs on benchmarks, which allows much deeper understanding of a model's performance.
This work conducts a fine-grained analysis of hallucinations arising in LLM reasoning and finds that the reasoning traces are particularly prone to Context-Sensitive Factual Hallucinations: cases where the model actually has the relevant knowledge, yet makes factual errors due to contextual interference during reasoning.
Reasoning representations are increasingly used as explanations for large language model outputs. Yet they are typically evaluated with model-centric criteria, such as answer accuracy and faithfulness, leaving it unclear whether they help people evaluate model responses. In this work, we study reasoning representations as human-facing interfaces rather than proxies for model reasoning ability. We conduct a controlled human study of six reasoning formats across tasks of varying complexity, supported by a web-based framework that randomizes task domains, problem instances, and representation order. The study collects fine-grained judgments of structural understanding, error detection and localization, and trust calibration. Our study shows a mismatch between perceived preference and support for human evaluation. Participants prefer planning- and decomposition-based representations, but simpler chain-of-thought traces better support verification, trust, and interpretability. Preferred representations also introduce calibration risks, with more false alarms on correct traces and high trust despite low willingness to verify.
Results show that capability failures can manifest as distributed, task-dependent changes in the structure of visible reasoning, and that CoT dynamics agnostic to whether the verbalized trace reflects the model's internal computations can help diagnose and correct failures.
Shashwat Sourav, Aishwarya H. Balwani· 0 citations
A major question in cognitive modeling concerns the behavioral alignment between large language models and humans across linguistic and non-linguistic tasks. Unlike standard LLMs, large reasoning models (LRMs) are optimized with reinforcement learning from verifiable rewards, encouraging correct solutions to reasoning tasks rather than preference-aligned responses. Recent work (de Varda et al., 2025) investigates the cost of thinking in humans and LRMs by comparing human reaction times with model reasoning traces across a range of reasoning tasks. We isolate this alignment by turning to abductive reasoning: unlike deductive tasks, its difficulty cannot be inferred from formal structure and offers no shortcuts a model could exploit to mimic effort without genuine search, providing firmer ground for empirical claims of shared effort. We find further evidence of alignment between LRM and human reasoning effort, as well as evidence that models and humans tend to make similar errors. Finally, we show that decoding methods that let models explore multiple reasoning paths increase alignment in reasoning cost between humans and LRMs across the three models tested.
CDS is introduced, a training-free meta-reasoning framework equipped with residual demand assessment: at each step, an LLM-based progress evaluator characterizes the residual reasoning required to arrive at a solution rather than merely evaluating the previous step.
John Scoville, Shengzhuang Chen, Yejin Bang et al.· 0 citations
Large language models (LLMs) are often post-trained on pre-collected reasoning trajectories to improve their reasoning capability. Such trajectories tend to be long due to complex, interwoven paths, which often include detours on the path toward the answer. However, it has been underexplored whether LLMs indeed benefit from learning complete trajectories in post-training, such as supervised fine-tuning (SFT). Starting from our pilot study, we find that full trajectories provide only limited benefit, while partial trajectories are effective even under heavy truncation. We analyze redundancy in reasoning trajectories through attention-based analyses and controlled token-removal studies, both of which show that intermediate tokens contribute minimally to final reasoning quality. This suggests that avoiding redundant information may allow LLMs to internally infer coherent alternatives by inferring missing steps from their internal knowledge, given known trajectory endpoints. Furthermore, we show that training LLMs using endpoints leads to consistent changes in reasoning behavior, and that it also benefits post-training methods based on reinforcement learning or on-policy distillation, highlighting the need to revisit complete reasoning traces. Code is available at https://github.com/naver-ai/revisiting-trace.
Jaehui Hwang, Sangdoo Yun, Byeongho Heo et al.· 0 citations
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