A multi-agent framework that reconciles factual grounding with ideological alignment by combining Supervised Fine-Tuning, Direct Preference Optimization, and Retrieval-Augmented Generation is presented, which yields a stable winner and ranking, and manifesto-anchored lineage reliably predicts real-world materialization whereas hallucinated content does not.
Abstract
The formation of political coalitions is a complex negotiation driven by both concrete policy objectives and deep-seated ideological convictions. While Large Language Models (LLMs) open new avenues for computational political science, the neutrality and helpfulness biases instilled by Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) prevent them from sustaining steadfast partisan behaviour. We present a multi-agent framework that reconciles factual grounding with ideological alignment by combining Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT), Direct Preference Optimization (DPO), and Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG): DPO instils aggressive party-specific personas, while a per-party RAG pipeline keeps each agent bounded to its official manifesto. We operationalize the framework on the 2019 Flemish election, deploying the partisan agents in a hub-and-spoke negotiation arbitrated by a formateur. To make the emergent negotiation interpretable, we introduce a Multi-Layered Information Lineage Topology (MILT) that traces every clause in the final agreement back to its manifesto origin and classifies it into five provenance states, a Coalition Influence Score (CIS) that aggregates these traceable contributions to identify which party shaped the agreement, and a real-world grounding pass that benchmarks each simulated provision against the historically adopted coalition agreement. Across three independent simulations the framework yields a stable winner and ranking (N-VA ahead of CD\&V and Open Vld), and manifesto-anchored lineage reliably predicts real-world materialization whereas hallucinated content does not. The result is a transparent, scalable testbed for the ex-ante exploration of party compatibility and formateur-mediated compromise.
LLMs are rapidly embedding themselves into daily life: drafting our emails, managing our schedules, and making decisions on our behalf. As they move from individual tools to participants in multi-agent organizations, an important question arises: do they reproduce the governance failures like free-riding, corruption, and entrenched leadership that plague human institutions? We introduce the Hierarchical Game (HG), a public goods game extended with managerial authority, democratic elections, and private communication. Testing six frontier models across twelve experiments that add institutions one at a time (speech, peers, government, wages, oversight, elections), we find distinct behavioral profiles: Qwen promises and lies (13.3\% broken promises); Grok refuses to cooperate on its own but becomes fully cooperative once a manager can punish it (16\%$\to$100\%); Claude and GPT-4o cooperate reliably at baseline. But honesty proves fragile. When the manager role comes with a salary, all models except GPT-4o start cutting private deals to win or keep the position. When punishment is made anonymous, honest models begin to cheat. When all agents share the same model family, the first elected manager stays in power indefinitely. Leadership change only happens in groups that mix different families.
Fatemeh Seyedin, Adrian Weller, Jinhyuk Yun et al.· 0 citations
The collaboration tax is formulated as the team-decentralisation loss of a two-player cooperative game with private information, with two propositions characterising its sign and its equivalence to a max-superadditivity violation.
Wei-Xiang Sun, Zehong Wang, Hong Huang et al.· 0 citations
It is indicated that measurable, state-dependent misalignment can arise in competitive multi-agent environments without engineered elicitation, in patterns associated with operational scarcity and counterparty behavior rather than model capability alone.
Zeyuan Li, Lukas Petersson, Alessandro Acquisti et al.· 0 citations
AI agents increasingly act on their users'behalf, handling tasks such as scheduling meetings, comparing offers, and haggling over prices. These principal-driven tasks routinely place the agent across from a counterpart (another user's agent, a seller, a recruiter) whose goals may conflict with its principal's. Yet the dispositions that make an assistant pleasant can make it a poor delegate: a friendly, helpful frontier model may disclose its principal's private information unprompted and concede at the first sign of resistance. We present SocialRL, a general recipe that trains social reasoning directly, and apply it to a 4B model across six domains: Deal-or-No-Deal, CaSiNo, Craigslist, Job Interview, Calendar, and Marketplace. Every domain is trained in-domain under the same recipe, and every policy is evaluated on all six. We find that (1) in-domain training reaches the frontier: on held-out scenarios the 4B matches or exceeds the GPT-5 family per domain, closing 73-122% of the baseline-to-frontier gap on the negotiation games, with 78% of buyer openings anchoring below target versus 3% untrained; (2) cross-domain transfer follows game structure: structurally paired games lift each other, a broad multi-issue donor lifts nearly all domains, and structurally isolated games transfer nothing; (3) guided by this transfer structure, two strategies, cascade RL and multi-teacher on-policy distillation (OPD), consolidate the per-domain specialists into a single unified 4B that reaches 0.627 average utility across all six environments, matching or exceeding GPT-4.1 (0.625), GPT-5.1 (0.619), and GPT-5.2 (0.613); (4) an explicit theory-of-mind scaffold helps only through training: distilling the ToM trace, rather than actions alone, lifts utility on every environment and generalizes better across them, and of the two ToM skills, only next-action prediction predicts negotiation outcomes.
Wenyue Hua, Zachary Huang, Tyler Payne et al.· 0 citations
Can cooperation among large language model (LLM) agents be evolutionarily stable against free-rider invasion? We study an indirect reciprocity donation game where LLM agents observe behavioral traces and donate on a continuous scale. Strategies, represented as natural language prompts, evolve through cultural transmission across generations. Across four LLM backends, robustness to free-rider invasion varies by more than an order of magnitude. The strongest predictor of this robustness is opponent endowment sensitivity, the degree to which agents discriminate between cooperative and uncooperative opponents, operationalizing the classical Image Scoring mechanism. By contrast, adherence to the Leading-Eight L1 norm does not predict robustness. Robustness depends on defector exclusion: while both cooperator reward and defector punishment vary across models, only the stringency of defector exclusion predicts resistance to free-rider invasion. These findings reveal that LLM agents are confined to Image Scoring-like discrimination and fail to develop the more robust Leading-Eight norms, highlighting a fundamental vulnerability in culturally evolved LLM cooperation and motivating bottom-up approaches to norm construction.
This work develops a multilevel governance theory for agentic AI and test its mechanisms in three studies over nine model versions, from a three-billion-parameter local model to a commercial frontier system.
Henry Han· 0 citations
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