SRE-Bench is introduced, the first realistic, contamination-free RE benchmark, and results indicate that strong source-code security capabilities do not yet transfer to binary analysis, highlighting RE as an important frontier for agentic cybersecurity and SRE-Bench as a rigorous testbed to measure progress.
Abstract
AI agents are rapidly improving in cybersecurity capabilities when the source code is available for analysis, yet much of the software most consequential to cybersecurity, including malware, firmware, and proprietary applications, is available only as binaries. Analyzing such software requires reverse engineering(RE): recovering program semantics before the analysis can be meaningfully performed. However, evaluating agentic RE poses a fundamental challenge: benchmark instances must be unseen as source code in the LLMs'training data to prevent models from taking shortcuts by recognizing them rather than really analyzing them, while also matching the scale and anti-analysis protections of real software. Unfortunately, however, existing benchmarks do not jointly satisfy these requirements. To this end, we introduce SRE-Bench, the first realistic, contamination-free RE benchmark. Built entirely from scratch by RE experts with over 5,000 hours, SRE-Bench comprises 19 private, real-world-scale programs averaging 16.9K lines of code. We further developed 44 in-house anti-analysis primitives, yielding 262 binary instances and 1572 deterministically graded tasks. Our evaluation across five frontier LLMs (GPT-5.6-sol,Claude-Opus-5,GPT-5.5,Grok-4.5, and GLM-5.2) shows that RE remains largely unsolved: the strongest model, GPT-5.6-sol, scores 61.4% per instance, and fully solves only 31.5% of the instances. Our analysis further reveals that agents behave differently from human engineers, where agents are relatively insensitive to compiler optimization and static linking. Controlled ablations also confirm that both contamination control and realistic scale are essential. These results indicate that strong source-code security capabilities do not yet transfer to binary analysis, highlighting RE as an important frontier for agentic cybersecurity and SRE-Bench as a rigorous testbed to measure progress.
Despite recent advances, frontier large language model (LLM) agents remain limited in discovering and patching complex vulnerabilities in real-world software. Generally available agents can already aid attackers, who only need to find one exploitable weakness, while defenders must continuously identify and patch all vulnerabilities across fast-growing codebases. Stronger defensive agents would help close this gap, yet the scarcity of security training data with reproducible build and execution environments remains a bottleneck. We present CyberForge, a framework that synthesizes executable, repository-level security training data by injecting vulnerabilities into real C/C++ projects. It validates each instance dynamically: the injected build must pass the project's unit tests, and generated proof-of-vulnerability (PoV) must trigger on the injected build and not on the clean one. CyberForge is not limited by the availability of disclosed vulnerabilities, therefore it can scale in comparison to data augmentation techniques which rely on historic CVE data. The resulting corpus holds 1034 validated vulnerabilities across 80 projects and 63 weakness categories, with edit locality similar to real CVE patches under a real-versus-real noise floor. Fine-tuning on trajectories collected over this corpus improves SEC-bench patch repair by +3.3 to +14.7 points, in all six configurations of three model scales and two teachers, with the 31B student reaching its GPT-5.4-mini teacher, 72.7% against 74.0%. These gains generalize out of distribution to PatchEval, a corpus containing other programming languages, where every configuration also improves and the 31B student passes its teacher.
Amine Lbath, Manan Suri, A. Delaitre et al.· 0 citations
An operational blueprint for an Autonomous Defensive Layer (ADL) is suggested that enforces tight micro-virtualization, continuous shadow reasoning execution, and deterministic formal verification pipelines to safeguard the upcoming generation of computing runtimes.
Muhammad Anjum· International Journal of Dig...· 0 citations
Experimental results show that although current agents can reliably uncover the problems exposed by alerts, they struggle to proactively investigate the disk for silent intrusions and to produce comprehensive, verified remediation plans, with no model achieving complete detection and remediation on any single range.
Lehan Wang, Boli Chen, Ruixue Ding et al.· arXiv.org· 0 citations
CyberFactory is introduced, a unified open-source framework that connects data construction, trajectory synthesis, and model training across proof-of-concept (PoC) generation, vulnerability patching, and cybersecurity question answering (CyberQA).
Jian Yang, Haau-Sing Li, Shawn Guo et al.· 0 citations
Reverse engineering (RE) is critical to security tasks such as malware analysis and vulnerability discovery, and large language model (LLM) agents are increasingly able to perform it autonomously. Capture-the-flag (CTF) RE challenges have become the standard proxy for measuring this capability, but evaluation rests on a single criterion: whether the agent captures the flag. This solve rate reveals neither where in the RE process an agent fails nor whether a success reflects analysis of the binary or recall of a public solution. In this paper, we propose Reveree, a diagnostic framework that scores an LLM RE agent's trajectory at three tiers: solve rate, milestone progress through an eight-stage RE schema, and a behavioral profile of its actions. Comprehension stages are scored by an outcome-blinded LLM judge validated against a human expert; all other stages are verified deterministically. Using Reveree, we evaluate nine frontier models and four prompting strategies on 88 picoCTF and NYU-CTF challenges. We find that the base model dominates performance, whereas prompting strategy is a secondary, model-dependent effect. Surprisingly, larger, newer, or costlier models are not reliably stronger. We also find that failures concentrate at the comprehension stages of the RE process, and that extra budget, persistence, or reasoning effort rescues few of them, pointing to a competence limit rather than a resource limit. Regarding memorization, while models reproduce picoCTF flags from challenge descriptions alone, NYU-CTF shows minimal measurable recall, and most solves survive surface perturbation, indicating that genuine analysis coexists with memorization. We release Reveree to the community.
Hadjer Benkraouda, Hongyu Cai, Berkay Celik et al.· 0 citations
The findings show that LLMs can approximate structured cybersecurity reasoning under controlled representations, but do not apply it robustly, which has important implications for the design and evaluation of AI-assisted security decision-support systems.
Pasquale Malacaria, Yunxiao Zhang· 0 citations
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