RScope: Unveiling Global ROV Deployments and Dependencies in the Post-ROV Era

Abstract

The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) and Route Origin Validation (ROV) are critical to securing Internet routing, yet measuring real-world ROV deployment and dependencies remains challenging. Existing methods (control-plane analysis and data-plane probing) often struggle to distinguish local ROV adoption from upstream filtering at scale and face diminishing visibility as ROV adoption grows. We present RScope, a measurement framework that dynamically manipulates Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs) from controlled publication points to isolate the impact of individual Relying Party (RP) servers. By selectively invalidating prefixes for specific RPs and probing connectivity changes, RScope maps dependencies among 21,827 ASes, their transit providers, and RP infrastructure. Our findings reveal that 1,127 ASes actively deploy ROV in IPv6, while 1,815 benefit from upstream protection, leaving 69.6% of such "protected" ASes vulnerable to local hijacks. Notably, ROV deployment by major ISPs strongly shape global security, enabling it in the top 100 ASes protects 27.6% of networks, but disabling it in Tier-1s endangers 23.8%. We also uncover operational delays: router enforcement lags ROA updates by 37 minutes on average. These results highlight systemic risks in incremental ROV adoption, emphasizing the need for broader deployment. We open-source tools and datasets to support ongoing routing security efforts.