Sep 2026· Journal of Applied Economics and Policy Studies· Vol 19, pp. 255-269· 0 citations
Abstract
The weakening of the WTO's framework for trade conflict management, together with more unilateral measures and diverging national rules, creates distinct but related forms of uncertainty for governments and firms. The authors treat WTO weakness as part of a broader fragmentation of trade authority—not as the cause of every problem discussed. The main distinction is between two kinds of predictability. First-order predictability covers information and accommodation in the public regulatory environment. Second-order predictability covers how an affected firm responds. Using doctrinal analysis and structured comparison, two regulatory episodes are looked at—the Section 301 and Section 232 conflicts—and three firm-level commercial settings: Huawei-related export controls, Apple's tariff-driven supply-chain adjustment, and RTI Ltd v MUR Shipping BV. This comparison shows that mechanisms only improve predictability when the relevant actor has legal authority or practical control. Coordination can deliver better information or negotiated accommodation, but it cannot settle questions of international legality. Firms can make their own responses more predictable through compliance systems, lawful operational alternatives, and clear contractual terms. But they cannot create public-law permission where none exists. Trade governance is thus functionally differentiated and overlapping: public coordination and private ordering may address different aspects of the same disruption, but neither can replace authority it does not have.
In the context of increasing geopolitical competition and proliferation of security-driven trade barriers as well as growing industrial policy-driven activities by governments, the WTO has experienced systemic breakdown in negotiations, surveillance, and adjudication, the most significant of which is the absence of a f...
The apparent turmoil in the US-led liberal international order has left international relations scholars without a settled framework for explaining—or teaching—global governance. This Special Section addresses that gap by developing subsystems theory as an analytical approach for understanding change and continuity i...
J. Colgan· International Studies Quarte...· 0 citations
Deepfake governance is often approached as a problem of technical detection, legal prohibition, or platform responsibility. Yet formal regulation and multi-actor participation do not necessarily translate into effective governance capacity. This article examines why formally dense governance arrangements can remain ope...
Jin-Tao Shi· International Journal of Law...· 0 citations
Abstract:This research note analyzes the transformation of trade policy in a context of sustained global uncertainty characterized by geopolitical rivalry, economic fragmentation, and weakening multilateral governance. Drawing on recent scholarship in international political economy, it examines how traditional trade p...
Nicolás Albertoni, Lili Vessereau· Journal of Globalization, Co...· 0 citations
In 2024, an arbitral tribunal dismissed for lack of jurisdiction a claim brought by Koch Industries against Canada arising from the cancellation of Ontario’s cap-and-trade programme. This article argues that the award should be read not as a case-specific outcome but as the first encounter in investment treaty arbitr...
Jessica Crow· Journal of international eco...· 0 citations
This paper aims to identify a predispute governance gap at the trade-security interface and develops an institutional architecture for lawful US-China trade and investment under strategic rivalry and limited trust.
It combines functional analysis of the conditions required to complete lawful transactions wit...
Hilton L. Root· Journal of International Tra...· 0 citations
We use cookies to run the site and, with your consent, for analytics and to show ads.
See our Cookie Policy.