Measuring Legislature-Aligned Privacy Risks in Synthetic Graphs
TL;DR
SyntheGrAnon is introduced, a framework for evaluating synthetic graph anonymity that primarily targets the singling out, linkability, and inference risks outlined in the EU GDPR at the node and community levels, while also including edge-level attacks as an extension of the node-level setting.
Abstract
Graphs are a ubiquitous form of structured data, with applications in many privacy-sensitive domains, such as social and healthcare. As for other modalities, modern graph synthesizers enable the creation of realistic synthetic samples, facilitating privacy-preserving data sharing while maintaining high utility. Unfortunately, unlike such other modalities, there is no relevant work on evaluating the privacy risk associated with synthetic graphs. The fact that graphs, unlike, e.g., tables, naturally capture relationships between individuals means that existing approaches are not easily transferable. To allow quantifying these privacy risks, we introduce SyntheGrAnon, a framework for evaluating synthetic graph anonymity. SyntheGrAnon primarily targets the singling out, linkability, and inference risks outlined in the EU GDPR at the node and community levels, while also including edge-level attacks as an extension of the node-level setting. We design attacks tailored to synthetic graphs and, in addition, extend the existing methodology by leveraging multiple synthetic samples for our black-box attacks. In our evaluation, spanning datasets from social and financial domains and five generative graph models, including three modern diffusion-based options, we find that our attacks are mostly effective, achieving risks close to the maximum of 1 in some cases. However, they struggle with large-scale, attribute-scarce graphs.