From Antagonistic Talk to Cooperative Acts: The Effect of Polarization Cues on Newspaper Audiences

Abstract

Do media depictions of a ‘polarized society’ merely describe division or actually deepen it? We report two laboratory experiments in Germany (Study1 $$N=302$$ ; Study2 $$N=295$$ ). After reading authentic newspaper articles in which brief polarization cues were experimentally included versus omitted, participants (i) completed standard affective- and ideological-polarization measures and (ii) played incentivized Dictator, Ultimatum, and Trust Games with ideological out-group partners. Polarization cues increased both affective polarization and ideological extremity. Behavioral responses, however, were mixed. In the Dictator Game, where the recipient cannot respond, treated participants shared less with the out-group. In the Trust Game, characterized by mutual dependence and potential efficiency gains, treated participants sent more to out-group partners. Ultimatum behavior, where interdependence is partial, showed weaker and less consistent shifts. Taken together, polarization cues reliably heighten perceived division but do not uniformly translate into behavioral antagonism: even after cues that increase self-reported polarization, participants can still cooperate with ideological opponents when cooperation is perceived as mutually beneficial.