Improving Randomized Metric Distortion to 2.3282

Nisarg Shah

· 1 citation · ⚡ 1 influential · 36 references

TL;DR

The main contribution is to show how stability with respect to a random D can be used to bound distortion, and to show how stability with respect to a random D can be used to bound distortion.

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