Jul 2026· Annual International Computer Software and Applications Conference· pp. 1201-1206· 0 citations· 25 references
Abstract
The rise of agentic AI systems, which are autonomous, proactive, and capable of multi-step task execution, has transformed how individuals interact with intelligent technologies. While these systems promise efficiency and enhanced decisionmaking, they also introduce new ethical vulnerabilities. This study investigates a paradoxical mechanism in AI-assisted academic task delegation: as social acceptance of AI delegation increases, individuals rely less on internal moral regulation. Drawing on Moral Disengagement Theory and Social Norms Theory, we test a normative substitution model using SEM data from 280 European university students and find that subjective norms function as both mediator and moderator, amplifying delegation intentions while reducing the influence of moral disengagement. Shame proneness emerges as a secondary moderator that buffers the normative pull for individuals with strong internal moral emotions. These findings highlight a critical socio-technical risk: proactive AI systems may unintentionally erode moral accountability as their use becomes socially normalized. We discuss implications for responsible agentic AI design, governance, and human-AI collaboration.
This paper argues that the Stoic notion of prohairesis, the agent’s, who/which is a morally responsible being, reason-guided normative governance function that assents to or withholds assent from impressions offers a model for recentring machine behaviour on reason giving governance.
While prior research focused on antecedents of unfair events like social loafing, less attention examined consequence mechanisms or bystander perspectives. Drawing on the social intuitionist model (SIM), we develop a process model of when and how bystanders respond to coworker social loafing.
This research utilized the time-lagged design of three-wave in one large enterprise and three small and medium enterprises in eastern China.
The findings indicate that coworker social loafing evokes moral anger and norm-based moral reasoning, prompting ethical voice. Social consensus and cooperative goal interdependence influence norm-based moral reasoning through moral anger.
This research employs the SIM to explain the critical mechanism of moral anger linking observed social loafing to ethical voice via norm-based reasoning, highlighting the roles of social consensus and goal interdependence. It expands the research perspective of social loafing, demonstrates the dual-system model of moral behaviour and suggests that norm-based moral reasoning matters for coworkers' immorality in teams.
This paper aims to conceptualize ethical infrastructure overconfidence (EIO) as a form of moral disengagement that arises when organizations overestimate the objectivity and self-correcting capacity of digital technologies.
This conceptual theory-building article relies on logical deduction and mechanism elaboration to integrate macro-organizational scholarship with behavioral ethics. This study uses comparative illustrative vignettes drawn from archival records exclusively as secondary theoretical exemplars to clarify the plausibility of the framework. These vignettes function as deductive conceptual anchors rather than empirical casework or qualitative fieldwork.
The analysis identifies three mechanisms through which EIO functions as moral disengagement: moral justification, displacement of responsibility and ethical escalation latency, the delayed recognition of ethically relevant anomalies. EIO also suppresses perceived behavioral control, reducing individuals’ ability and willingness to escalate concerns. These effects intensify in institutionally fragile environments.
The framework highlights emerging ethical risks in AI-mediated organizations and offers actionable constructs for diagnosing failures of internal oversight and responsible technological governance.
This study advances a behavioral-ethical explanation for technology-driven ethical failures, integrating moral psychology, digital governance and institutional theory.
O. Kuran, L. Khabbaz· Society and Business Review· 0 citations
It is proposed to rethink social and tech ethics from the standpoint of a renewed attention to the constitutions of these economic actors within the capitalist system.
J. Schulz, Laura Robinson, Katia Moles· International journal of kno...· 0 citations
It is found that AI dependence does not have a significant direct negative effect on innovative behavior, and inhibits innovation exclusively through a full mediation pathway by eroding employee self-efficacy, indicating that the suppression of innovation is caused not by the technology itself, but by the “deprivation of mastery experiences” that accompanies over-dependence.
Byung‐Jik Kim, Yeon-Jun Choi, Julak Lee· Humanities and Social Scienc...· 0 citations
Why do we form moral judgments? One influential answer is that the human capacity for moral judgment is an evolutionary adaptation. P. Kyle Stanford argues that morality is adaptive because it leads individuals to externalize norms, prompting them to evaluate both their own behavior and that of potential partners by a single standard. In this paper, we examine Stanford’s hypothesis using a game-theoretic model. Our results support and extend his proposal, demonstrating that – under the assumptions chosen – externalization is a plausible driver of the evolution of morality as it fosters the learning of cooperation in challenging novel contexts. We find that externalization allows agents to avoid the exploitation trap: by resisting unsustainable short-term gains through exploitation, externalizing agents secure the benefits of robust long-term cooperation. By modeling externalization as a constraint on strategy and partner choice, we avoid the common pitfall of game-theoretic approaches to represent morality as a mere disposition toward altruistic behavior.
