Sep 2026· Programming Languages and Operating Systems· 0 citations· 12 references
Computer Science
TL;DR
This work presents zBulk, an automatic compartmentalization system that requires zero retrofitting to application code and paves the way for flexible fine-grained compartmentalization, and shows how to design zBulk, leveraging rustc's intermediate representations.
Abstract
Memory safety is a dominant driver in security and systems research. Rust has become a viable alternative to C/C++ for systems programming because of its strong memory safety guarantees. However, it is not a silver bullet. Unsafe sections, foreign code, and compiler-soundness bugs still pose vulnerabilities. Compartmentalization splits a program into pieces and executes these in isolated, collaborating contexts. This way, the impact of a software vulnerability can, ideally, be limited to a single compartment. However, manual compartmentalization approaches are considered labor-intensive and error-prone, and require deep system expertise. We present zBulk, an automatic compartmentalization system that requires zero retrofitting to application code and paves the way for flexible fine-grained compartmentalization. We achieve this high degree of automation by leveraging static type- and call information, and language constructs that declare mutability and ownership. We show how to design zBulk, leveraging rustc's intermediate representations. We verify the approach by fully automatically compartmentalizing a relatively small systems application with a single dependency into up to eight compartments. We discuss how this number can be increased for even more flexibility. We report overhead measurements for Intel SGX as a first isolation mechanism, with more to follow.
Rust has emerged as the leading system programming language, offering strong memory and type safety guarantees without compromising performance. This positions it as a compelling alternative to traditional languages like C and C++, which are susceptible to memory security bugs. However, manually transforming C to Rust...
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