It is argued that copyright law will likely take a functional approach to the question, finding that LLMs contain a copy of a particular work only if it is straightforward to extract that work in outputs.
Abstract
Recent work shows that it is possible to extract verbatim or near-verbatim text of some copyrighted works from some large language models (LLMs or models). That is evidence that the model weights encode the works in some form - that the model has"memorized"those works from its training data. But LLMs don't store information in the same format as familiar databases. Rather, their weights store statistical relationships between tokens that have been learned from the training data, and those relationships inform a generation process that is often probabilistic rather than deterministic. In the case of memorization, those relationships are strong enough that, in many circumstances, the model might generate a copyrighted work from its training data with some probability. Copyright law has not previously had to decide whether storing information that might or might not produce output similar to a copyrighted work is itself a copy of the work. The answer to the question is important, because it may determine the legality of many LLMs. The statute and case law are largely unhelpful. We argue that copyright law will likely take a functional approach to the question, finding that LLMs contain a copy of a particular work only if it is straightforward to extract that work in outputs. That result is unsatisfying as a policy matter, and we suggest potential changes to the law, but it is the most likely outcome under current law.
This work follows invented facts written into Qwen3 models from creation through sequences of twenty to one hundred later writes, using held-out questions of five types, and finds that facts can be behaviourally forgotten without being erased.
Recent work suggests that transformer language models show a bias towards human languages over unnatural ("impossible") languages argued to be unacquirable by humans. However, this literature has largely based these claims on differences in sample efficiency and test-set perplexity, rather than on direct evaluations of the linguistic capacities that could plausibly explain non-attestation in human languages. We evaluate two theoretically motivated linking hypotheses: impossibility arising from deficiencies in grammatical sensitivity or generative production. Using GPT-2 style models trained on perturbed"impossible"variants of English, we measure sensitivity to grammaticality using BLiMP minimal pairs, finding that model performance exhibits only gradual degradation, mediated by the language's information locality. In contrast, these models exhibited pronounced failures in generation, producing substantially fewer high-quality sentences at longer lengths. Together, these results suggest generative deficiency and transmission failures as a plausible linking hypothesis between language model behaviour and non-attestation of impossible languages.
Silicon sampling uses language models as proxies for human survey respondents, treating each model call as an independent draw from the persona's response distribution. We show this draw does not exist: instruction-tuned models do not sample from distributions, they collapse to a single output. The same persona on the same question returns the same answer on more than half of items in a public-opinion benchmark. The collapse is sharp: the model's internal probabilities concentrate on a single option, and the failure is substantially amplified by instruction tuning: across three model families with materially different post-training pipelines, every instruction-tuned model fails on every task we test, while base models fail far less often. Strikingly, the same model that cannot sample from a distribution can describe it accurately in a single call. We call this gap the KNOWS/DOES split, and trace it to a degenerate sampling primitive visible in the logits and induced by alignment training. Exploiting this split, asking the model to describe the response distribution in one call more than halves the error against human survey data compared to persona aggregation. For applications that require per-persona outputs, we propose Prompt-Perturbed Argyle (PPA), which reduces the same error by 21% at no added cost.
Large language models increasingly rely on sampling as a driver of their own improvement, making the fidelity of their learned distributions more critical than ever. Yet, not all distributions are equally easy to learn. In this work, we identify a curse of ambiguity: in large language models, and more broadly in all neural networks that produce discrete probability distributions, the more ambiguous a next-token distribution is, the harder it is to learn accurately. Through an extensive theoretical analysis, we trace this curse to architectural and learning roots. More ambiguous distributions require more capacity to be stored, larger embeddings to be represented, more steps to be fitted, and amplify token-sampling noise. We validate these findings on synthetic tasks with controlled ground truth and observe the same signatures in language models trained on real data. Our results provide a new perspective on the statistical capabilities of large language models and a practical framework for when to trust their output distribution.
Nicolas Zucchet, Hyun Dong Lee, Scott W. Linderman· 0 citations
Abstract Language models (LMs) are commonly criticized for not “understanding” language. However, many critiques focus on cognitive abilities that, in humans, are distinct from language processing. Here, we instead study a kind of understanding tightly linked to language: inferring “who did what to whom” (thematic roles) in a sentence. Does the central training objective of LMs—word prediction—result in sentence representations that capture thematic roles? In two experiments, we characterized sentence representations in four LMs that have been proposed as models of human language processing. The overall representational similarity of sentence pairs did not reflect whether they had the same agent/patient assignments or opposite agent/patient assignments. Furthermore, we found limited evidence that thematic role information was available in any subspace of hidden activations. However, some attention heads robustly captured thematic roles, independently of syntax. Therefore, LMs can extract thematic roles but this information influences their representations weakly.
Joseph M. Denning, Xiaohan Guo, Bryor Snefjella et al.· Annual Meeting of the Cognit...· 2 citations
Whether neural language models (NLMs) possess the ability to distinguish strings on the basis of their grammaticality remains a debated topic in the computational linguistics literature. Existing evidence has largely relied on probability-based measures, testing whether models assign higher probabilities to grammatical than ungrammatical strings. However, probability comparisons have been criticized as a measure for grammatical knowledge based on the assumption that grammaticality is inherently entangled with likelihood. Model-assigned probability is a function of many related sentence properties, such as lexical frequency, plausibility, and world knowledge. In this work, we move beyond probability-based evaluations and investigate whether grammaticality is encoded in the internal representations of NLMs. Using mass-mean probing, we test whether grammatical and ungrammatical sentences are systematically separated in representational space. We further examine the extent to which these representations are independent of sentence properties that are correlated with grammaticality, as well as their generalization across grammatical phenomena and languages. Our results provide evidence that grammaticality is robustly encoded in sentence representations of a wide range of pretrained NLMs, yielding clear representational separation on the dimension of grammaticality that cannot be fully explained by alternative sentence-level factors. Moreover, this encoding generalizes across a broad range of grammatical phenomena and to some degree, across languages, suggesting that grammaticality constitutes a coherent representational dimension in contemporary NLMs. These findings contribute new evidence to debates about the nature of syntactic knowledge in language models and offer a complementary framework for evaluating grammatical competence that is not dependent on string probabilities alone.