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On Success and Simplicity: A Second Look at Transferable Vision–Language Attack Pipeline

Jul 2026 · IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security · Vol 21, pp. 6898-6912 · 0 citations · 47 references
Computer Science

TL;DR

This paper identifies three previously overlooked issues caused by inappropriate cross-modal interactions and excessive operations in the Simple Vision-Language Attack (SimVLA) pipeline, and proposes the SimVLA, which observably improves transferability and efficiency.

Abstract

Vision-Language Pre-training Models (VLPMs) are known to be vulnerable to adversarial attacks. Recent transferable attacks on VLPMs have followed a common pipeline with complicated loss functions or multi-stage text/image attacks. However, in this paper, we demonstrate that such a sophisticated attack pipeline can be simpler yet more successful. Specifically, we identify three previously overlooked issues caused by inappropriate cross-modal interactions and excessive operations. To address them, we propose the Simple Vision-Language Attack (SimVLA) pipeline, which observably improves transferability and efficiency. Experiments on four datasets and three downstream tasks validate the superiority of our pipeline. For instance, on Flickr30k text-image retrieval dataset, our SimVLA outperforms the SOTA baseline in R@1 transferability by 8.01%-14.71%, while consuming only about 35.73% of the time and 46.26% of the max VRAM. Overall, the superiority of our SimVLA highlights the importance of leveraging domain knowledge (e.g., our proposed cross-modal word identification), while blindly pursuing intricate operations (e.g, complex loss functions and redundant multi-stage designs) may even be harmful. We hope our SimVLA can serve as a simple yet effective backbone for future extensions. Code is available at https://github.com/RYC-98/SimVLA

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