Multiple Voting Shares in French Listed Companies
Abstract
553Abstract In June 2024, France adopted a landmark reform allowing listed companies to issue multiple voting shares on regulated markets and multilateral trading facilities. This reform represents a pivotal evolution in France’s approach to the one-share-one-vote principle, aligning its company law with a broader international shift toward permitting dual-class share structures. These structures are increasingly used to help founder-led firms scale and access public capital markets while retaining the control necessary to pursue long-term strategic visions. However, the separation of control from economic ownership raises serious governance concerns, including misalignment of incentives, weakened accountability, and the potential for minority shareholder expropriation.This article critically assesses whether the French regime achieves an appropriate balance between the interests of founders and the protection of public investors. It evaluates whether the legal safeguards embedded in the new framework are sufficient to address governance risks without discouraging innovative firms from going public. The analysis combines doctrinal and comparative approaches, positioning France between permissive models like the United States and more restrictive ones in Asia.