This work recast black-box black-box LLM steganography as a sequential communication problem with causal, noiseless feedback: every generated token is observed by both parties and can guide subsequent embedding.
Abstract
As large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used to automate digital interactions, users can leverage LLM-generated text as cover for covert communication within seemingly benign conversations. Existing LLM steganography, however, is predominantly white-box, requiring the sender and receiver to share the cover statistics, typically through access to the model weights and prompt. Black-box schemes remove this requirement by allowing the receiver to operate solely on the generated text, but current approaches rely on fixed-length, open-loop watermarking techniques that suffer from high decoding error rates under variable-length token generation. We recast black-box LLM steganography as a sequential communication problem with causal, noiseless feedback: every generated token is observed by both parties and can guide subsequent embedding. Based on this perspective, we introduce \textbf{B}urnashev \textbf{A}daptive Posterior \textbf{M}atching (BAM), a feedback-coding scheme that combines posterior matching with a decode-and-confirm phase. The design is inspired by classical information-theoretic feedback-coding principles, while its security is established through a cryptographic reduction proof. Across three open-weight language models, we demonstrate that BAM attains 0-0.1\% empirical message error on an 8-bit payload in around 50 tokens, across 1000 trials, versus 10-17\% for the strongest black-box baseline at comparable length. Building on the proposed steganography algorithm, we demonstrate the feasibility of an end-to-end communication protocol that achieves high communication rates across multiple conversational settings.
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