A Comparative Analysis of Political Legitimacy in the Great Learning and Plato's Republic

Abstract

Political legitimacy constitutes a foundational problem in political philosophy, concerning the justification of authority and the conditions under which power is recognized and obeyed. This paper offers a comparative analysis of political legitimacy as articulated in two classical texts of the Axial Age: The Great Learning in the Confucian tradition and Plato’s Republic in ancient Greek philosophy. Situating both works within their respective historical and intellectual contexts, the study argues that they present distinct yet structurally comparable models of legitimacy. Confucian political legitimacy is grounded primarily in moral virtue and the Mandate of Heaven, emphasizing internal moral cultivation, ethical governance, and popular support as manifestations of Heavenly will. By contrast, Platonic legitimacy derives from external transcendence, locating political authority in the philosopher-king’s grasp of eternal truth and the Form of the Good. Through textual analysis and conceptual comparison, this paper examines how virtue, wisdom, justice, and truth function as sources of political legitimacy in the two traditions. By highlighting both their shared rejection of coercive power and their divergent transcendental foundations, this study seeks to contribute to comparative political philosophy and to reflect on the contemporary relevance of classical legitimacy theories for modern governance, leadership ethics, and education.