It is argued that function name sequences suffice to capture the high-level semantics of a transaction, and hence can be used to detect blockchain application attacks, and TxLucent, an automated framework to detect blockchain application attacks by extracting application semantics from transaction call traces is proposed.
Abstract
Blockchain application attacks, targeting business logic bugs in decentralized applications (dApps), have been an increasing concern to their developers and users, causing significant financial loss. Existing attack detectors either rely on handcrafted rules for detection, or need difficult-to-obtain smart contract source code to analyze attack transactions. This makes them brittle and inapplicable in practice. In this paper, we argue that function name sequences suffice to capture the high-level semantics of a transaction, and hence can be used to detect blockchain application attacks. Our empirical study on transactions from 424 real-world attack incidents shows that 98.46% of call traces can be resolved to function names, whereas only 74.78% invoke contracts with available source code. Based on this observation, we propose TxLucent (pronounced"translucent"), an automated framework to detect blockchain application attacks by extracting application semantics from transaction call traces. TxLucent maps call traces to function name sequences and uses a transformer to learn semantics from such sequences. Consequently, TxLucent can detect attacks without relying on hand-coded patterns or source code. Our results show that TxLucent achieves a 1.56% false negative rate on 424 known incidents with 14,611 attack transactions, and an estimated 0.0017% false positive rate for benign transactions from over 500 million transactions on the Ethereum blockchain. Finally, TxLucent takes an average of 24.90 milliseconds to analyze a transaction, thus supporting real-time attack detection on popular blockchains.
Blockchains enable decentralized applications through smart contracts---interactive programs executed through consensus. However, the inherently asynchronous nature of blockchain transaction ordering introduces a class of vulnerabilities known as frontrunning attacks, which have caused millions of dollars in losses in...
Sebastian Holler, Anna Piscitelli, Jannik Albrecht et al.· 0 citations
Blockchain introduced secure, peer‐to‐peer transactions in decentralized environments without reliance on central authorities. However, attackers continue to exploit blockchain projects. Over the past decade, reported blockchain exploit losses have exceeded $24 billion. Although existing research analyzes blockchai...
Abdur Rehman Raza, Shahzaib Tahir, M. Bilal et al.· Security and Privacy· 0 citations
DeLLMGuard is proposed, a smart contract deployment framework that defends against malicious LLM-based vulnerability scanning while preserving public source disclosure and authorized auditing and outperforms the closed-source bytecode baseline on the primary non-proxy set.
Ming-Yuan Huang, Zimo Ji, Yifan Mo et al.· 0 citations
Blockchain Remote Procedure Calls (RPCs) serve as the primary interface for interaction between decentralized applications and blockchain networks. Despite their critical role, existing RPC implementations are prone to bugs that are often challenging to detect using traditional testing methods. In this paper, we introd...
Yu Xiao, Yuhong Nan, Zhi-Jie Zhong et al.· Proceedings of the ACM on So...· 0 citations
Decentralized Applications (DApps) serve as a critical technical underpinning for business logic and user interaction within the blockchain-powered Web3 ecosystem. However, DApps are prone to faults, and localizing these faults within their intricate and often interconnected logic is a particularly time-consuming proce...
Xuan-Yu Zhu, Zhi-Ying Wu, Tao Wang et al.· Proceedings of the ACM on So...· 0 citations
Blockchain systems are increasingly targeted by on-chain attacks that exploit vulnerabilities in smart contracts, resulting in billions of dollars in losses. Understanding and reproducing these attacks is critical for defense, yet currently relies on manually crafting proofs-of-concept (PoCs), which is labor-intensive,...
Xing Su, Hao Wu, Han-Zhong Liang et al.· Proceedings of the 41st IEEE...· 0 citations
We use cookies to run the site and, with your consent, for analytics and to show ads.
See our Cookie Policy.