Incentivizing Effort While Learning the Market Condition
When a firm hires an agent to generate customers in a new market, neither party initially knows whether the market is favorable. In “Dynamic Contract Design with Learning,” Wang, Liang, and Sun study the interaction between learning and moral hazard: effort is costly and unobservable, so a missing arrival may reflect an unfavorable market, bad luck, or shirking. The firm’s goal is to design a dynamic contract governing arrival-based payments and termination, thereby motivating effort while learning whether to continue. Yet shirking can make the principal more pessimistic than the agent and create scope to manipulate future payments. The authors prove that an optimal contract inducing full effort until termination exists, but computing it appears prohibitively complex. They develop two simple online contracts with payments and termination thresholds fixed in advance. Both induce full effort and achieve O(ln T) regret over T periods against a first-best, full-information benchmark. A matching Ω(ln T) lower bound proves rate optimality. The results extend to continuous time and differing prior beliefs.
We study repeated contract design when a principal observes outcomes but not the actions that generate them. The principal may use any bounded outcome-contingent payment vector, and the agent's best response can make expected profit discontinuous in those payments. For every fixed number $m\ge2$ of outcomes, the minima...
Rui Ai, David Simchi-Levi, Han Zhong· arXiv.org· 0 citations
In this paper we construct a dynamic entry deterrence game in which market demand follows the Chan-Karolyi-Longstaff-Sanders (CKLS) stochastic differential equation (SDE). The incumbent firm, whose true strength is privately known, uses advertising and promotional expenditures strategically to shape the entrant’s belie...
M. Issah, Paramahansa Pramanik· SN Business & Economics· 1 citation
We study task assignment under adverse selection and moral hazard. In the single-task setting, agents privately know their types, which determine their success probabilities and effort costs. Based on the agents'reported types, the principal selects an agent to perform the task and offers a success-contingent payment....
Matteo Bollini, Matteo Castiglioni, A. Marchesi· 0 citations
Digital resale platforms allow buyers to either purchase at a posted price or submit a lower offer subject to uncertain seller acceptance. This study develops a stylized finite-horizon dynamic program in which the buyer jointly chooses whether to bid and how much to offer while retaining a buy-now fallback. A savings t...