A Strategic Game-Theoretic Fusion of Bertrand Competition and Stackelberg Leadership for Secure Cooperative Communications

Abstract

Cooperative communication is a key enabler of high data-rate and long-distance transmissions, offering ubiquitous coverage in a cost-effective manner. However, safeguarding such systems against full-duplex active eavesdropping remains a critical challenge for next-generation wireless networks. This paper proposes a five-stage joint Bertrand–Stackelberg game framework to enhance physical layer security and optimize power allocation in cooperative networks. In addition to forwarding the data from source to destination, the relay from the intermediate nodes intelligently identifies the eavesdropper’s action and further another intermediate node jams it. The joint game formulation captures the hierarchical and competitive interactions among legitimate nodes and adversaries, enabling optimal transmission and jamming strategies. In addition, an economic incentive mechanism is introduced to determine optimal pricing for cooperative nodes, promoting their active participation and improving network utility. Extensive simulation results validate the proposed framework, demonstrating significant gains in secrecy rate, power efficiency, and robustness against full-duplex active eavesdropping under diverse network conditions.