From a philosophical perspective, this book considers whether artificial intelligence (AI) undermines human autonomy. Are we becoming increasingly controlled by external forces when AI makes decisions for us? Characteristics such as artificial autonomy, opacity and extreme speed could mark a tipping point at which self-determination gives way to external control. Responsibility becomes questionable when decisions are not transparent and human control is lost. At the same time, autonomous AI systems make it difficult to assess the truth and reliability of information. Ultimately, the book views AI as a form of 'smart power' that subtly—and often almost imperceptibly—influences our thinking, judgement and actions.
The doctoral thesis examines issues at the interface between technology and law and highlights the use of artificial intelligence in legislative work. The focus is thus on an area of application that has so far only been considered marginally in scientific discussion, even though it is already technically feasible and at the same time highly relevant for the future. The core of the study is the question of the extent to which the legislative use of AI is compatible with the unalterable core of the constitution. To this end, necessary legislative changes are identified and specific duties of care are derived, based on the requirements of the Artificial Intelligence Act.
The Embodied Hijack hypothesis is advanced, arguing that the goal is epistemic alignment — bringing how users interpret these systems into correspondence with what these systems actually are — and that this alignment is achieved through interface design rather than user education.
Sheila L. Macrine· Frontiers in Psychology· 0 citations
It is suggested that if the view is right, a certain type of moral risk can be averted since researchers are unlikely to stumble into accidentally creating AI models that are conscious, and a new form of AI risk that arises from the view.
Justin Tiehen, A. Tubert· Journal of Consciousness Stu...· 0 citations
This paper explores the impact of Artificial Intelligence (ai) and its various socio-technological tools on the quality of political deliberation. It particularly analyzes the deliberative processes that occur within institutional frameworks under principles of political representation. The proposed hypothesis is that AI, under certain conditions, has the potential to actively participate in deliberative processes within democratic frameworks, improving the quality of public debate, broadening inclusion, and strengthening collective rationality. To this end, two interrelated analyses are proposed, one theoretical and the other methodological: 1) the ideal conditions that any ai intervening in public deliberative processes must incorporate to preserve its democratic legitimacy; and 2) the design of a matrix that allows for verifying these conditions in specific cases.
According to the legal-grammatical picture of constitutivism, the constitutive standards of a kind x carry an existential threat: abiding by them is necessary for being an x at all. But this seems to leave no room for defective x’s—the bad-x problem. A functional model escapes this problem, yet it fits structural rational agency poorly. I argue that a suitably complex legal-grammatical model—one attentive to how legal enterprises are materially realized—makes room for genuinely internal violations: intelligible fouls, correctable from a dynamic kernel of perfect compliance. The existential threat survives, yet genuine defect finds a place within it.
Luca Ferrero· Canadian Journal of Philosop...· 0 citations
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