TL;DR
It is shown that in a BIKE multi-instance setting an attacker can construct a DOOM instance with nM syndromes, and multi-instance security of code-based KEMs degrades as a function of M.
This paper suggests that as a key exchange mechanism, BB84 should be run with security parameters comparable to those of ML-KEM, and analyzes performance implications if this choice is taken, and offers general guidelines for BB84 parameter selection.
This work presents a comprehensive Soft-Analytical Side-Channel Attack (SASCA) targeting the implementation of the iterative Karatsuba algorithm, and presents the optimized factor graph and algorithm tailored to the binary values and sparsity of HQC to make the SASCA more practical.
It is shown that not all leaky signatures carry information about the secret subkey, and the notion of informative signature relations is introduced, which allows us to define a preprocessing step, called filter-and-shift that leads to ILWE instances that require a smaller sample amount.
This work revisits the side-channel resistance of the latest HQC reference implementation, with a focus on its polynomial multiplication routine used in decryption, and proposes a zero-cost mitigation based on swapping operand roles so that the mask computation depends only on public data.
The long-standing open questions of copy-protection of point functions, copy-protection of compute-and-compare programs, and identical-challenge secure copy-protection of decryption keys and all puncturable functionalities are resolved.
The Miranda signature scheme relies on masking a matrix code which disposes of a masked underlying structure, and the knowledge of which allows for efficient error decoding. We consider a Gabidulin code which is expanded into a matrix code, that is only \Fq-linear. An additional masking is then applied to it. The attac...
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