Cyber-Resilient Network Security Architecture For Al-Haramain Digital Infrastructure: Threat Detection, Zero Trust And Operational Continuity At The Grand Mosque In Makkah
TL;DR
The review concludes that Al-Haramain digital services require an identity-centred, observable and recoverable security architecture capable of maintaining trusted minimum operations during partial compromise.
Abstract
-The Al-Haramain operational environment increasingly depends on interconnected sensors, smart cameras, edge-computing nodes, high-capacity networks, identity services, analytics platforms and control-room applications. This dependency expands the cyber-attack surface of a safety-critical digital infrastructure in which loss of availability, manipulation of data, credential compromise or delayed detection could disrupt operational awareness. This review therefore examines cybersecurity and network resilience as its primary subject; real-time crowd monitoring is used only as the operational case through which security requirements are evaluated. An integrative review of literature published from 2020 to 2025 synthesises evidence on Internet of Things security, network intrusion detection, multi-access edge-computing security, federated anomaly detection, zero-trust architecture, microsegmentation, model integrity and cyber recovery. The study identifies principal attack paths across field devices, edge workloads, 5G and fibre transport, application services, data and machine-learning pipelines, privileged identities and third-party dependencies. It proposes a literature-derived conceptual/reference defence-in-depth architecture comprising cryptographic device identity, secure boot and attestation, default-deny segmentation, encrypted communications, continuous network and workload telemetry, adaptive threat detection, least-privilege access, protected model pipelines, immutable logging, verified backups and orchestrated recovery. Cyber resilience is assessed through mean time to detect and contain, attack-path reduction, trusted-service coverage, failover time, recovery integrity and bounded degradation. The architecture is not presented as an operationally validated cybersecurity framework; a representative cyber-range/simulation pathway is specified for future empirical testing. The review concludes that Al-Haramain digital services require an identity-centred, observable and recoverable security architecture capable of maintaining trusted minimum operations during partial compromise